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ABSTRACT  
 
Shortly following the Cuban Revolution in 1959, communist leaders Ernesto 
“Che” Guevara and Fidel Castro made it a top priority to address the poor health of the 
country’s citizens.  By developing a large pool of physicians, Cuba instituted 
groundbreaking approaches to biomedicine that emphasize prevention and the physician-
community relationship.  The high physicians per capita ratio also permitted Cuba to 
develop its now famous system of international biomedical diplomacy.  Cuba’s successes 
domestically and abroad occur within the context of the regional geopolitical 
environment, in which Cuba is subjugated to extraordinary economic pressures from the 
U.S. embargo.  The superior health of the Cuban national body despite substantial 
barriers serves as physical evidence to validate the communist principles established in 
the Revolution.  This opposition to Western hegemony has allowed Cuba to become a 
leader and form partners in the region, such as Venezuela.  The Cuban-Ecuadorian 
relationship is much newer, and is mainly focused on a project in which Cuban 
physicians are contracted by the Ecuadorian government.  While this is the current focus, 
actions by Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa indicate that Ecuador will use this project 
to shift his country’s ideology to one that is more similar to that of Cuba.  Though still 
developing, the Cuban-Ecuadorian relationship provides Ecuador with the opportunity to 
improve its health care system while increasing its regional influence by becoming a co-
leader with Cuba in the region. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
On December 1, 2014, the Cuban government named Ecuador’s President, Rafael 
Correa, an honorary member of the Cuban Medical Brigade that arrived in Ecuador in 
August 2014.  The Cuban Ambassador to Ecuador appropriated placed the ceremony in 
the greater context of the Ecuadorian-Cuban partnership.  Ambassador Rodrígues said, 
“We are here for two reasons: the first is because there was a Revolution in Cuba that has 
formed tens of thousands of health professionals, despite the aggressions and the U.S. 
embargo; and the second, [is] because here, in Ecuador, there is now a government that 
dedicates substantial material resources to improve the health of its nation (The Rep. of 
Cuba, “Honor De Brigada”).”  His rhetoric emphasizes the close relationship Cubans 
associate between the Cuban Revolution and the state of its health care system.  
Additionally, he implicitly links the current health care changes in Ecuador to the Cuban 
health care system formed under the Revolution. 
One major result of the relationship is (and will be) the incorporation of Cuban 
physicians into the Ecuadorian health care system.  The Cuban medical system is 
prestigious internationally, and Cuba is well known for its focus on medical diplomacy, 
including but not limited to rapid response teams for recent Ebola outbreaks in West 
Africa.  Ecuador’s reputation in health care does not typically receive much attention; it is 
simply grouped together with other developing countries regarding health care systems 
   
 2 
and indicators. In my thesis, I am interested in the question of why Ecuador would look to 
Cuba, as opposed to another country, as an example to improve the quality of its national 
health care system.  To answer this question, I look into the broad question of how Cuba 
has become an effective provider of high quality, free health care, despite its economic 
circumstances.  I investigate this by examining the structure of domestic Cuban health 
care and how it blossomed under the guidance of Che and Castro following the 
Revolution.  I study the Cuba’s tradition of biomedical diplomacy from its beginning, 
examine the way in which Cuban physicians integrate themselves into and operate within 
other countries, and investigate the principles that keep Cuban medical diplomacy an 
essential part of Cuban culture.  Following the history of Cuba’s international presence, I 
then look at how Cuba’s success biomedically has presented the nation with opportunities 
that has allowed it to become a leader on specific issues. 
I argue that there are four key reasons why Ecuador is partnering with Cuba in 
health care.  First, Cuba is a developing country (in most regards), but has succeeded in 
the health care sector despite the barriers developing countries face, plus additional 
extraordinary pressures.  Second, the agreement between Ecuador and Cuba will not only 
improve the quality and access of Ecuadorian health care, but also will impact Ecuador’s 
trajectory and role in Latin America.  Third, global recognition for its health care allows 
Cuba to become a player in international affairs not directly related to health care.  Thus, 
its health care system becomes an even more appealing model for Ecuador because 
Ecuador may also be able to improve its international standing.  Lastly, Cuba also offers 
Ecuador strong backing in Ecuador’s attempt to reestablish its sovereignty by creating 
domestic and international policies that favor its partners within the global South.  
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Through this partnership, Ecuador has the potential to gain much from a nation that has 
done so well with so little.   
 Cuba has maintained its communist ideology, in contrast to the capitalist United 
States, and showed that its system of health care is successful, if not superior, to that of 
its ideological opponent.  This opposition to American hegemony realized through 
biomedical achievement of the national body is a factor that greatly appeals to Ecuador.  
The cooperation of the countries through entities that foster solidarity, such as ALBA1, 
helps to reinforce Ecuador’s recent sociopolitical realignment to the new left.  The 
coalition has been described by one expert as: “A direct challenge to neoliberalism, 
offering instead regional integration prioritizing, among other things, ‘the fight against 
poverty and social exclusion’, the end of ‘unequal exchange’ in international relations, and 
a revival of state intervention and political participation, especially by indigenous peoples 
(Lievesley 6).”  
Although Ecuador and Cuba differ by varying degrees in political structure, 
socioeconomic barriers, infrastructure, and national biomedical policy, Ecuador has 
turned away from the neoliberal policies from previous decades and shown itself a new 
leader in the Latin American left.  This is seen in Ecuador’s constitution, in which it 
makes several references to sumac kawsay, or “living well”, and a preamble that 
emphasizes increased democratic as one method for “living well” (Becker 282).  While 
Ecuador now rejects neoliberalism, Cuba first emerged as the paradigm for many Latin 
American countries to incrementally reject the interventionist policies of Washington and 
                                                
1 Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América. English translation: Bolivian Alliance for the 
Peoples of Our America. 
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forge their own path, often in ways that unite the region.  This political movement is seen 
in countries such as Ecuador, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Uruguay, known as the 
“pink tide” that expand upon the leftist foundation Cuba created in Latin America.  In 
recent years, Venezuela, under the Chavez government, has proved that Latin American 
countries can take on larger roles in Latin America’s new left. 
Ecuador, like many other Latin American countries, has a complicated and coup-
prone history where the United States has consistently played a role either directly or 
indirectly.  Ecuador’s President, Rafael Correa, has made a conscious effort to distance 
himself from the United States, allowing Ecuador to forge stronger alliances with other 
Southern governments, some of which the United States vehemently opposes.  His pivot 
away from the United States, regardless of its underlying motives, has not been well 
received in Washington.  Ecuador is sandwiched between Colombia and Peru, two of the 
hemisphere's largest illicit drug producers, consequently increasing Ecuador’s 
geopolitical significance for the United States (Narins 43).  Thus, actions that President 
Correa views as simply protecting his small nation’s sovereignty, Washington interprets 
as calculated maneuvering to reduce its influence in the region while non-allies replace it. 
Ecuador has consistently made itself an ally to other Southern governments, 
strengthening South-South alliances and countering American attempts to maintain 
hegemony.  Partly resulting from its geographic positioning, but also for its reliance on 
the United States dollar as its national currency, Ecuador will be able to distance itself 
from the American economy only so far.  Yet under President Correa, Ecuador has shown 
itself a supporter of similarly exploited or marginalized countries who are unafraid to 
challenge American interests, such as Iran, Venezuela, and the Palestinian state.  Through 
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Ecuador’s consistent stances on various global issues, it continues to align itself with 
Cuba, while preparing itself for domestic adaptations of Cuban policies, such as the 
Cuban health care system.  The relationship, currently focused on slowly restructuring 
Ecuadorian health care, not only implies future change in the Ecuadorian national body, 
but also implicates that parallel political and societal shifts will occur. 
 Regardless of how strong the relationship becomes, Ecuador will likely never 
experience a crippling and tense relationship with the United States, as Cuba has.  
American2 foreign policy has negatively impacted no other country more than Cuba as a 
result of the 1963 American embargo, which remains in effect (United States: 4).  
Decades of aggressive American foreign policy have resulted, in effect, in American 
extraterrestrial jurisdiction in Cuba, supported by the United States’ pivotal role in the 
global economy.  Additionally, the world’s increased reliance on technology, including 
the medical community’s, has hindered Cuba’s capacity to advance in certain respects.  
How can Cuba succeed in health care, when resources that are viewed as essential, such 
as technological infrastructure, may simply be neither available nor reliable?  Cuba’s 
achievements in medicine are possible thanks to principals established during the 
Revolution. 
 Upon becoming the Cuban head of state after the revolution in 1959, Castro 
asserted that the state of health care within Cuba was deplorable and in need of 
significant change.  He emphasized that in order to accomplish the goal, the Cuban 
medical system needed to become a socialized and sustainable system that could provide 
                                                
2 I use the terms “America” or “American” interchangeably with (the) United States.  This should not be 
interpreted as the “America” which encompasses both North and South America, an interpretation some 
Latin American countries use. 
   
 6 
comprehensive care for the national body (Brotherton 2012: 66).  I employ the concept of 
the national body, related to the body politic, as a metaphor for the organic, physical 
entity that a nation’s citizens create, particularly suitable for the context of healthcare.  
The notion draws on work from scholars such as Mary Douglas and medical 
anthropology theory.  Health care became a core initiative of the entire government in 
response to the poor state of the national body, which was that of a third world country.  
In 1960, the infant morality rate per 1000 live births in Cuba was 37.3, whereas in 2010 
the figure was a mere 4.5 deaths (The Rep. of Cuba, Cuba vs. Bloqueo).3  The rate in 
Ecuador was 117.7 in 1961 and 21 in 2010, a sign of Ecuador’s still underdeveloped state 
in health care (World Bank).  In comparison, the United States’ rate in 2010 was 6.43 
deaths, still higher than Cuba’s (Kochanek and Murphy).  Compared to Ecuador, Cuba 
began with a healthier national body in 1960 resulting from a wealthier population, but its 
ability to decrease its infant mortality to rates superior to those of most developed 
countries is an impressive feat. Therefore, in regards to Castro’s goal of radically 
changing—or revolutionizing—the health of the national body, he undoubtedly 
succeeded.  What surprised most of the world, especially developed nations, was (and 
continues to be) Castro’s desire and proclamation for Cuba to be a world medical power.   
Cuba’s success in health care appears contradictory due to its comparability (or 
superiority) to developed countries.  In 2012 Cuba’s incidence of tuberculosis was 9 per 
100,000 people, outperforming “developed” countries such as the United Kingdom and 
Spain, while Ecuador’s rate was 59 (World Bank).  This indicator often conveys a 
                                                
3 It is important to note that infant mortality rate here measures infant death until they reach one year of 
age.  Therefore, the measure encompasses not only factors that influence the prenatal period and actual 
birthing process, but also postnatal factors such as nutrition. 
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country’s developmental status, as tuberculosis is nearly nonexistent in developed areas 
of the world (with the exception of its linkage to AIDS in the developed world).  
Regarding life expectancy at birth, Cuba’s figure is 79 years, the exact same statistic for 
Costa Rica, Chile, and the United States, among others; Ecuador’s life expectancy is 76 
(World Bank).  Regarding maternal mortality rates, Cuba falls into a favorable range 
again, with 73 out of 100,000 women dying annually due to complication in childbirth.  
The average for developing countries in Latin America is 82 and Ecuador’s is 110.  Cuba 
is clearly an outlier due to its atypical success in knowledge production and its 
application in the field of health care, yet is still considered a developing country in many 
other regards, where it lags behind substantially.  Hence the title, “We live like the poor, 
but we die like the rich,” a Cuban quote which reflects the paradoxical state of Cuban 
health care.  Cubans may face hardships common to the developing world, but they will 
likely live a longer, healthier life, dying of “rich” diseases.  Ecuador, on the other hand, 
presents health care data that corroborates its classification as developing country.  
This accomplishment was not realized overnight, but since biomedicine’s role as a 
keystone of the (Cuban) communist ideology in both government and society, its 
prominence in rhetoric and practice has never diminished.  Cuban physicians apply their 
craft within a system that distinguishes itself as one that contrasts to the global North, 
specifically the United States.  Though, this is only a byproduct of the training that 
intermingles a deep sense of pride and nationalism into the formal medical education 
process, not the original intent.  With less emphasis on technological reliance, perhaps 
not always by choice, Cuban doctors employ a skillset that places more value on 
prevention.  Preventative medicine’s success requires that physicians be in constant 
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contact with the communities of their patients, highlighting the importance physician-
patient relationship for Cubans.  Cuba’s now-famous method of training physicians—
resulting in revolutionary-tilted biomedicine—has shown to be particularly effective 
when exported around globe as well.  Decades of domestic biomedical success have 
essentially produced an informal marketing campaign on a global scale, where Cuba has 
transformed itself into an international biomedical provider.  Countries throughout the 
world, including Ecuador, not only look to Cuba as a source of biomedical care, but also 
as a model to deliver comprehensive health care to its citizens.  Developing countries 
now have a model to emulate from their own global South, challenging the notion that the 
health care systems utilized in the global North are the only viable options.  
I utilize Ecuador as a case study, to illustrate the complex intersection of 
international and domestic health care policies, biomedicine, and regional geopolitics.  
Unlike Cuba, the health indicators of Ecuador reinforce its status as a developing country.  
I investigate the internal disparities between different populations and then incorporate 
Cuba—how it will attempt to resolve the maladies plaguing the Ecuadorian national body 
and the tensions it creates between different groups.  I then look at the international 
political maneuvering by Ecuador and its relationship to the Cuban-Ecuadorian health 
care partnership. Lastly, I study the legal mechanisms in place to prepare the country for 
the addition of Cuban physicians, as well as future projects that have already arisen in 
bilateral talks. 
In sum, I argue that Cuba has established a trade system in which it exports 
medical personnel in return for tangible goods: oil and money, and the intangible: 
prestige, solidarity, and sympathy.  Ecuador has not become a party to the trade system 
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simply for Cuba’s biomedical achievements; rather, the developing relationship is more 
nuanced.  With the creation of the 2008 constitution, Ecuador signaled that the values it 
once believed in, largely from the capitalist West, no longer accurately reflected the 
country’s trajectory.  Ecuador fittingly chose Cuba for the ideals that its physicians 
embody, (Cuban) Revolutionary principles that reject the current, capitalistic Ecuadorian 
health care system in favor of one that aims to improve the national body, as opposed to 
individual populations.  Although the Cuban-Ecuadorian partnership is currently focused 
on health care, Ecuador also uses Cuba’s support to assert itself regionally by aligning 
itself with Cuba and other leftists Latin American governments.  In doing so, Ecuador 
rebuffs Western hegemony and demonstrates itself eager to shape its own destiny, which 
will very likely include Cuba.   
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CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY 
 
 The preexisting pool of research and history concerning Cuba’s domestic and 
international biomedical program is vast and easily accessible, primarily due to its 
success since the Revolution.  Although I was unable to travel to the island, various non-
Cuban experts in Cuban biomedicine have spent extensive periods of time there, 
observing and analyzing the system.  Most studies are published outside Cuba, which 
provides experts an environment to formulate conclusions with less bias, an advantage 
that Cubans are not always given.  Though certain themes of my research were not 
directly related to Cuban politics, Cuban health care is fundamentally political due to the 
government’s complete control of the system.  Perceptions of the Cuban government as a 
whole, from both proponents and critics, are bound to influence their views of the Cuban 
health care system.  Therefore, I incorporate a variety of sources from different 
individuals, entities, and organizations that hold a variety of views of the Castro regime 
in order to attain a balanced representation of the past and present status of Cuba’s 
biomedical system. 
 In contrast to Cuba, the body of history and current knowledge is markedly 
smaller.  As should be evidenced, Ecuador is not known for its biomedical success, but 
instead for its expected subpar performance.  The health of Ecuador’s national body 
matches the expectation for the region, few aspects of it are surprising; therefore, it draws 
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less attention from the international biomedical community compared to Cuba. The tone 
of sources also varied between countries. Whereas information about Cuba can be 
extreme, overly critical or extolling, many Ecuadorian sources are simply dismayed at the 
state of the Ecuadorian health care system.  The information available will likely continue 
to grow due to recent changes to the system and the newly strengthened partnership with 
Cuba.   
Much of my analysis regarding Cuba and Ecuador’s biomedical histories is based 
upon existing research from anthropologists, biomedical doctors, historians, and political 
scientists.  This provided the proper foundation for Cuba’s current role in international 
biomedicine as well as in Ecuador.  In order to show the current health conditions in the 
two countries, I used information from several international databases as well as census 
data compiled by each country.  To investigate the new Cuban-Ecuadorian biomedical 
partnership I relied on several semi-structured interviews.  I conducted interviews with 
different individuals who either provided a personal experience, hold a government or 
institutional position, or who conduct research on health care systems.   
Interview questions varied with the each interviewee, but examples include: In 
your opinion, what is the greatest challenge facing Ecuadorian health care?  How could 
the new penal code (COIP) affect the way in which Ecuadorian physicians practice?  
What could Cuban physicians offer to Ecuador that its own physicians cannot?  What are 
the most noticeable difference in the curriculum and training of the Cuban medical 
education system compared to that of other countries?  During your time in Cuba, what, 
if any, differences did you notice regarding health care during the período especial?   
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Since the Cuban-Ecuadorian partnership on health care is still developing, I 
regularly consulted sources for updated information.  This included thorough multi-
weekly surveys of two daily Ecuadorian newspapers published online, as well as the 
Ecuadorian Ministry of Public Health’s online press releases.  I used the same method for 
Cuba’s national, party-sanctioned newspaper and the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
Sample search terms include: Cuba, Ecuador, COIP, médicos ecuadorianos, médicos 
cubanos, salud, brigada, and acuerdo.   
The combination of interviews, raw data, government press releases, and 
newspaper articles provided an adequate pool of information for this thesis.  I faced two 
main challenges while researching.  The first was finding information on the history of 
health care in Ecuador and the current system. This difficulty during my research proves 
important, in that it underscores the differences in recognition and assigned value 
between the two systems.  The second issue was locating and contacting Cuban 
physicians.  Contacts who tried to connect me with Cuban doctors in Cuba were unable to 
do so because the doctors did not feel comfortable.  Additionally, since the Cuban 
medical brigade arrived in Ecuador behind schedule, I was no longer in the country and 
therefore could not contact them.  I expect that as the countries continue to adopt new 
technology, records of personnel will improve, as will the ability to locate and contact 
them. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  
BIOPOLITICS AND MEDICINE 
 
I. Introduction 
Two key concepts inevitably play a role in the intersection of biomedicine, 
globalization, and national identity: the body politic and governmentality.  In discussing 
the latter, Lock and Nguyen explain Foucault’s theory as such: 
 
Foucault coined the term ‘governmentality’ to refer to the way in which 
the exercise of power by the modern state came increasingly to include the 
active management of the population to stimulate its vitality, and the 
adaptation of codes and techniques by individuals to govern their own 
lives, for instance by adopting a ‘healthy’ lifestyle… Central to this form 
of biopower, exemplary of the modern state, is the idea that a ‘population’ 
is a living object…(Lock and Nguyen 24, 114)” 
 
 In order to apply Foucault’s theory, one must also understand his notion of 
biopower, the overarching idea that has a more literal meaning: having the power, 
authority, or leverage to subjugate a physical body, or in this sense many bodies, the 
national body (Lock and Nguyen 24, 114).  These terms illustrate the state’s ability to 
shape—sometimes literally—the bodies of its citizens as an expression of national 
identity and/or government clout.  This may manifest itself in various ways, such as the 
creation of new groups and classifications within the national body (Lock and Nguyen 
25).  Said categories are often created from nothing.  Unrelated bodies are classified and 
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related in ways to find commonalities that did not “exist” previously.  Hacking describes 
this term as the looping effect.  Examples of individuals who are given new categorical 
identifiers within society include abused children, single mothers, refugees, and senior 
citizens (Hacking 23).  By implementing such constructions of perception, the 
government is able to redraw societal boundaries, allowing more rights and privileges for 
some, while marginalizing others.  That is, those already in power have the capacity to 
reshape societal structures either for their own advancement, or for the overall 
advancement of the national body.   
 The body politic condenses and combines the aforementioned concepts, but more 
importantly, it finds the common linkage between them.  The body politic theorizes that 
the national population can be viewed as a single entity that is headed by the most 
powerful group or individual, typically the national government in whatever form it 
takes.  Because the body politic is a single entity that includes government, any actions 
belonging to “governmentality” reconfigure each individual body, and therefore the 
national body.  This reshapes both the self-perception and outward reputation of the 
nation.  The notion of conceptualizing government and a nation through the body politic 
is not a recent development.   Hobbes defines it as such: “…a Commonwealth or State, 
which is but an artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for 
whose protection and defense it was intended; and in which the sovereignty is an artificial 
soul, as giving life to the whole body… (Hobbes 413) ”  The language he uses is 
intentional, drawing a clear connection between a nation and its physicality.  He 
continues, “Lastly, the pacts and covenants by which the parts of the body politic were at 
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first made, set together, and united resemble that of a fiat, or the let us make man… 
(Hobbes 414).”  Eugene Thacker summarizes the concept as such: 
 
The body politic is a response to the challenge of thinking about political order (as 
a living, vital order).  It is formally based on an analogy between the body natural 
and the body politic (through a narrative stressing unity, hierarchy, and vitalism).  
This formal relation is historically expressed in terms of political theology (and 
the questions of sovereignty and the “two nature”).  And, despite this formal 
coherence, it is also a concept defined through its failure (that is, its internal 
tensions and corporeal variations) (147). 
 
Through the Cuban Revolution, the Cuban government has become a testament to this 
concept.  Its ability to realize biomedical bodily adjustments changing internal and 
external views has been essential to maintaining power.  Its centralize governmental 
structure under the communist party allows for the implementation of sweeping decisions 
without the often-problematic political discourse that other countries encounter their 
attempt to create significant change.4 
 
II. National Identities and Biopolitics 
The biopower exerted by the Cuban government upon the body politic can be 
characterized as dominating when the appropriate statistics are applied.  According to 
reliable estimates, Cuba outperforms every other comparable group regarding vaccination 
campaigns.  The unchallenged authority of the communist centralized government under 
                                                
4 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, or Obamacare, is perhaps the most well-known recent 
example for Americans.  Such dramatic and politically charged conflicts are virtually nonexistent in Cuba 
as well as in other countries where one party maintains all, or most of the power.  Interestingly enough are 
the two vastly different outcomes of government inserting itself into the role of health care provider (or at 
least financier).  In the United States a large portion view Uncle Sam as overstepping his boundaries, re-
gardless of the potential positive outcomes.  In comparison, Cuba, though the public plays a very different 
role, the national public and international spectators have largely viewed government intervention as the 
path to tangible progress. 
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Fidel Castro, now under his brother Raúl, is essential in the implementation of programs 
such as vaccine dissemination which has seen unquestionable success, as seen in the table 
below5: 
 
Figure 1: Target Population Vaccination Rates 
Vaccine Cuba All Developing Countries 
All Developed 
Countries Global 
BCG 99 83 83 83 
DTP (3rd dose) 99 75 96 78 
HepB (3rd dose) 96 57 63 55 
Hib (3rd dose) 96 17 80 21 
MCV (measles- 
containing 
vaccine) 
99 75 92 77 
Polio (3rd dose)  99 76 94 78 
 
 Not only has the Cuban government been effective in its physical bodily 
reformation, but also in the mental and subconscious of the national body.  Brotherton 
devotes a significant amount of his text to the commentary and analysis of the 
government’s long and successful history of biomedical propaganda.  Cuban propaganda 
becomes embodied in citizens’ community-based biomedical actions.  These internalized 
notions are realized with the underlying belief that in order for the health of the national 
body to maintain its reputation as an international model, all members of society must 
                                                
5 Source: WHO 
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participate; the national body’s success demands the respect and attention from each 
individual member.  This politicized idea of communal responsibility is not new under 
the Cuban revolution, though it is dramatically magnified as its success is highly touted 
as a part of national identification for the individual as well as the entire nation. 
Most significant is the penultimate column where all developed countries are 
combined and averaged together.  Cuba maintains a higher vaccination rate, a 
consequence the government’s structure, which allows for a rapid implementation of 
high-impact decisions that affect both the health and perception of the national body.  A 
report also concluded that the Cuban National Immunization Program “is known and 
understood not only by health professionals, but also by the general public, who in turn 
become spokespeople for broader education on the subject (Reed and Galindo 6).”  This 
is the perception to which I refer.   
This tendency to police oneself (meaning the national body), in order to maintain 
a healthy body politic, signifies the strong influence that the health of the island has on its 
unified national identity.  Not only has Cuba reconfigured its national identity with 
domestic biomedical success, but Cuban biomedical presence abroad also has 
socioeconomic implications regarding the reconstruction and perception of national 
identity for the host country.  The positive international reputation in biomedicine 
contributes to a Cuban national identity with which both the government and national 
body can be associated.  Cubans view themselves as a metaphor and living example of 
the communist value—yet uniquely Cuban—that the national body is a dynamic product 
of comprehensive, nationalized, and free health care disseminated to the masses.  
Although there is marked difference between the political ideologies of communist Cuba 
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and socialist Ecuador (though such differences might be lessening), it becomes quite 
obvious that they overlap in this belief of leftist political embodiment via biomedical 
practices.  Ecuador has taken serious steps to provide health care to its entire population, 
in ways similar to Cuba, while also calling it an inherent right in its constitution.  
Furthermore, Ecuador’s choice to incorporate Cuban doctors into the current public 
health care system points to a growing emphasis on health care managed by the state.   
Not only has Cuba demonstrated indicators of its biomedical success 
domestically, its track record of medical diplomacy makes Cuba an even more fitting 
model for Ecuador to emulate in terms of domestic health care reforms; but, 
incorporating aspects from the Cuban health care system into another can be met with 
hesitation and confrontation. .  Feinsilver provides a telling example of internal 
consequences resulting from the implementation of (external) Cuban physicians: 
 
This more familiar approach [of living within one’s community] is 
changing expectations as well as the nature of doctor-patient relations in 
the host countries.  As a result, Cuban medical diplomacy has forced the 
reexamination of society values and the structure and functioning of health 
systems and the medical progression within the countries to which they 
were sent and where they continue to practice.  In some cases, such as in 
Bolivia and Venezuela, this threat has resulted in strikes and other protest 
actions by the local medical associations… As Cuba’s assistance 
concentrates more on the implementation of some adaption of their own 
health service delivery model, the threat will become more widespread. 
(284) 
 
Feinsilver explains that sections of foreign societies are not always welcoming of Cuban 
biomedical support.  This is seen in Ecuador’s current terrain where the Ecuadorian 
government must sooth domestic physicians’ worries (discussed in a later section) while 
trying to implement its own agenda with the Cuban health care model.  Therefore the 
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insertion of external, foreign individuals into the greater body politic of a host nation 
brings about a reassessment of the national identity for both countries.  Significant 
change in a topic as essential, often polarizing, as health care in a country—where 
citizens and government consider it a right—reconstitutes previous ideas of self-
perception relating to and stemming from the national body.  Whereas Cubans have a 
strong sense of their national body’s image, one that gives them pride, Ecuadorians do 
not.  
Although the primary reason for Ecuador’s employment of the Cuban health care 
system is to truly better the overall health of the national body, it would be an over 
simplification to claim that this is the only reason for its implementation in Ecuador.  
Cuba has constructed an international reputation for delivering health care not only to its 
own national body, but specifically to marginalized populations, which sometimes have 
little in common with Cuban culture or political ideology.  For example, similar to other 
Andean countries, Ecuador has a various indigenous populations, each with a different set 
of cultures, traditions and values.  Cuba however, has no such native population.  Yet, 
these groups do share the same classification of a “global proletariat,” which the Cuban 
government aims to and unite.  Although this goal towards solidarity is not stated, it is 
often one that is expressed in both Che and Castro’s public discussions on medical 
diplomacy and its multiple facets. 
 
III. Latin America’s Response to Western Hegemony 
Upon joining ALBA Ecuador’s current president, Rafael Correa, stated, “ALBA 
is a political project based on solidarity, integration, and being the owners of our own 
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destiny6 (Prevost 131).”  President Correa is clearly concerned about his country’s ability 
to form its own domestic and foreign policy independent of the United States.  ALBA, 
the coalition of leftist governments in Latin America, provides Ecuador the political 
reinforcement to choose its own path, or follow a path similar to Cuba’s.  It seems 
unlikely that the desire to form a relationship with the United States’ foe is the primary 
reason for Ecuador’s utilization of Cuban methods of health care.  I believe that the 
Ecuadorian government, headed by President Correa, views Cuba as an equitable partner, 
rather than the United States, where both core political values and the construction of 
society are quite different.  A platform of Correa’s first campaign was the creation of a 
new constitution, which was ratified in 2008 by nearly two-thirds of Ecuadorians 
(Prevost 118).  This strong showing affirmed the new trajectory of Ecuador under Correa.  
Furthermore, the document’s contents themselves uphold the values that align with Cuban 
and Chavista policies.  Similar to Venezuela, the new constitution expands spending in 
education and healthcare, as well as created two new branches of government, the 
National Electoral Council and the Council of Citizenship Participation and Social 
Control (Becker 118-119).  In a more recent showing of solidarity, the Cuban Foreign 
Minister stated, “We confirm the excellent relation between our nations, the Citizens’ 
Revolution7 [of Ecuador] and the Cuban Revolution are united for the benefit of our 
nations and our America (The Rep. of Ecuador, “Cancilleres de Ecuador”)”.  Ecuador’s 
                                                
6 My emphasis added. 
7 Original Spanish: Revolución Ciudadana.  The Citizens’ Revolution is a program implemented by the 
Correa administration under which many government projects fall.  It is used more as a marketing or prop-
aganda tool to show Ecuador’s progress, rather than a transformative event such as the Cuban Revolution. 
Examples are the ubiquitous large signs hung on new buildings the new infrastructure as a result of the 
“¡Revolución Ciudadana!” 
   
 21 
view of Cuba as an ally and model (in certain contexts) is not one-sided.  Cuba echoes 
such sentiments, even referring to the “Citizens’ Revolution” to draw parallels between 
the two nations.  
 Ecuador’s opposition to American intervention has thus far not been as overt as 
that of Cuba.  The first major confrontation occurred in 2008, when Ecuador denied the 
renewal of an expiring ten-year lease of a United States military base in Manta, Ecuador 
(Romero).  Each nation interprets the refusal differently.  The United States considers the 
base in Manta a “forward operating location,” meaning it is used to carry out counter-
narcotic missions typically along the Ecuadorian-Colombian border.  No other American 
base exists in the area, so Washington valued it quite highly.  Since its establishment, the 
base has never truly symbolized positive Ecuadorian-American cooperation.  The base 
came about due to a failed attempt to utilize Howard Air Force Base in Panama for 
similar purposes, leading American officials to turn to Ecuador (Romero).  The 
agreement was signed in 1999, during a severe economic crisis in Ecuador in which the 
terms of the agreement unabashedly favored the United States.  The agreement leased the 
land to the United States for ten years, without any payment to Ecuador (Romero).  In 
2009 when the lease was not renewed, American forces left the base and the Ecuadorian 
government now occupies it. 
 The United States is not the only foreign power that has tried to exploit Manta’s 
resources.  Manta, a natural deep-sea port, was simultaneously courted in 2007 by a 
Chinese (Hong Kong, specifically) multinational company, Hutchison Port Holdings, 
while the American base negotiations were floundering (Narins 45).  The economic 
stimulus that was the American military base quickly became the Chinese shipping 
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company stationed only a few miles away (Narins 46).  Hutchison Port Holdings signed a 
thirty-year, $520 million contract with the Ecuadorian government, yet disagreements 
soon arose.  In less than three years the company withdrew from Manta following a 
dispute with the Ecuadorian government concerning timetables for investments (“Update 
on Manta Dispute”).  Hutchison Port Holdings transferred its facility to the Manta Port 
Authority and terminated its operations. 
 Another disagreement between the American and Ecuadorian governments 
occurred in 2011, when the Wikileaks scandal embarrassed many in the Obama 
administration and aggravated tensions across the globe, including those with Ecuador.  
One cable exposed the then U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador, Heather Hodges, who 
criticized President Correa for his selection of a corrupt high-ranking police commander.  
She indicated that he was selected for the ease in which the Correa administration would 
be able to influence him.  Hodges lambasted the Ecuadorian president for perpetuating a 
system of cronyism (“The U.S.-Ecuadorian Diplomatic Row”).  She was officially 
declared persona non grata by the Ecuadorian government on April 5, with the United 
States reciprocating the action two days later.  Tensions have since dissipated and both 
embassies now house ambassadors.   
 Ecuador has also been involved in discussions or events that do not deal with the 
United States directly; rather they challenge American foreign policy in one way or 
another.  Ecuadorian-Chinese cooperation has markedly increased in the past few years, 
illustrated by projects such as a $2.25 billion hydroelectric dam and the potential for a 
$13 billion oil refinery.  This substantial expansion in cooperation has caused China to 
become the second-largest foreign investor between Canada and the United States, 
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respectively ("U.S., Ecuador: Cooperation”).  Perhaps encouraging more investment from 
the Chinese rather than American corporations should not be considered an anti-
American maneuver, considering Beijing and Washington currently are on fairly good 
terms.  Ecuador, though, has sought out transactions with others who were (are) 
undoubtedly regarded as American enemies, such as Iran.  In 2010 under former 
President Ahmadinejad, Ecuador negotiated with Iran to purchase $400 million worth of 
Iranian fuel.  The deal occurred while the United States and the European Union pushed 
for a boycott on Iranian oil ("U.S., Ecuador: Cooperation”).  Prior to the negotiations, 
then President Ahmadinejad also visited several Latin American Counties, including 
Ecuador, and pledged to build a refinery within the country (Gill).   
 Ecuador has continued the trend of aligning itself against of the United States 
within the Middle East, seen in the most recent Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  While the 
United States maintained its vehement support for the Israel throughout, Ecuador 
supported Palestine.  Coordinated through Egypt, Ecuador sent a number of supplies to 
the Palestinian state in an overt show of solidarity (“Ecuador ultima con Egipto”).  
Similarly, Cuba sent supplies days later, also promising to permit wounded Palestinians 
to travel to Cuba in order to receive proper medical treatment (The Rep. of Cuba, Cuba 
“Envía Ayuda”).  It is not to say that Palestine ought not have allies, especially during a 
humanitarian crisis, but rather actions by Cuba and Ecuador cannot be viewed in a 
vacuum.   
Although their actions are indeed humanitarian in nature, they must also be 
interpreted following the current global political environment.  Ecuador has taken its cue 
from Cuba in forming relationships with countries that the United States and other 
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Western powers have little, if any, dialogue.  Actions of solidarity emphasize Ecuador’s 
belief that the Western method of politics, government, health care, etc. is not and should 
not be the only option.  Through Ecuador’s methodical readjustment of international 
relations, it asserts its own sovereignty while also publicizing its alignment with Cuban 
foreign policy in many contexts.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
REVOLUTION AND BIOMEDICINE 
 
I.  Background 
Therefore, the National General Assembly of the Cuban People proclaims 
before America, and proclaims here before the world, the right of the 
peasants to the land; the right of the workers to the fruits of their labor; the 
right of the children to education: the right of the sick to medical care and 
hospitalization… Some people wanted to know what the policy of the 
Revolutionary Government of Cuba was.  Very well, then, this is our 
policy. (Castro) 
 
 From the onset of the revolution, Castro made it a priority to provide medical care 
to his people.  In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly in 1960, Castro 
made his case evident for the importance of (free) health care, calling it an inherent right 
of the Cuban people, which both created the expectation for it to become a hallmark of 
Cuban national policy, while simultaneously criticizing his capitalist neighbors present 
during his long-winded speech.  It is unlikely that Castro predicted that the health care 
system that prospered under his guidance would eventually become more than a 
mechanism for improving the lives of Cubans; rather, it became a tool—to improve 
health abroad—or a weapon—to gain support for Cuba’s economic plight caused by the 
United States—however he chose to use it. 
   
 26 
When the revolution began under Fidel Castro, he relied greatly on the help and 
guidance of Ernesto “Che” Guevara, an Argentinian now held in high regard in much of 
Latin America.  Before becoming a revolutionary, Che studied medicine in Argentina, 
possibly one source for Castro’s health care emphasis on medicine on the island. The 
doctor-turned-revolutionary delivered a speech in 1960 specifically geared towards 
biomedicine and the revolutionary ideology to the Cuban Militia concerning what he 
titled “revolutionary medicine.” In it he outlines the role of the physician in the 
revolution within Cuba and around the world: 
 
Nevertheless, the militias have a function in peacetime; the militias should 
be, in populous centers, the tool that unifies the people. An extreme 
solidarity should be practiced, as I have been told it is practiced in the 
militias of the doctors… If we medical workers—and permit me to use 
once again a title which I had forgotten some time ago—are successful, if 
we use this new weapon of solidarity, if we know the goals, know the 
enemy, and know the direction we have to take, then all that is left for us to 
know is the part of the way to be covered each day (Guevara). 
 
Che argues that the role of the physician or any other health care personnel is that of a 
warrior, charged with the responsibility to fight to improve health of the national body.  I 
utilize this term to evoke the image of a singular, cohesive object as opposed to a 
population, which fundamentally recognizes the individuals that comprise the larger 
group.  Furthermore, the term establishes the national population as an entity with agency 
within a biomedical context; its singular form can therefore be used as a representation 
for the overall health condition.  In Cuba’s case the national body’s success also 
influences international perceptions and thus can be used as symbolic capital.  The speech 
mixes sentiments of war, conflict, and nationalism in his language, despite speaking to an 
audience of doctors. Che’s rhetoric highlights the importance he and Castro placed on 
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this field of science even as the revolution was in its infancy.  Not only are Cuba’s 
leaders admired for their uncompromising stance on free, comprehensive health care 
provided by the state, but also for their ability to excite and mobilize support within the 
national body.  
 Che’s remarks prefigure the importance of Cuba’s reputation as a “global medical 
power.”  Although the Cuban government at this time had not invented this concept yet, 
its leaders had the foresight to see the potential benefits of biomedical success on the 
island. These remarks lay the foundation for the pervasive Cuban-state health care 
rhetoric still seen today.  Especially when exposed to a foreign audience, leaders continue 
to praise the country for revolutionizing national heath care, especially its hallmark 
feature, the Medicos de familia system.  This comprehensive community health care 
structure accomplishes the principles that Che and Castro wanted the Cuban government 
and its physicians to embody and subsequently project onto the national body.  However, 
such a system did not emerge immediately from the revolution, but had roots before 
Castro took power.   
A major antecedent to the current health care system in Cuba was a system known 
as mutualistas, where Cubans who had Spanish ancestry, could opt into a type of 
insurance where a monthly fee covered all medical care.  This system covered roughly 
20% of the Cuban population, about and had a budget of roughly 40 million pesos, more 
than twice the size national government’s (Brotherton 2012: 61).  The care provided by 
practitioners within the system was considered quite respectable for the time, above 
regional standards.  The system was comprised of some 242 hospitals and clinics, 
typically concentrated around urban centers.  Even though the system was quite good, it 
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was exclusive; it was only available to those who met the racial and socioeconomic 
qualifications.  The vast majority of Cubans could not overcome those barriers and 
therefore had no way of accessing health care on a consistent basis.  Despite the system’s 
flaws, the idea of effective and accessible health care delivered to a large number of 
people was a concept used in the post-revolutionary system.   
 Once the revolution occurred, permanent structural changes within the larger 
communist bureaucracy became universal throughout the country.  The Ministry of 
Health and Welfare became the Ministry of Public Health, and the People’s Health 
Commissions was created in order for the new government to have a large source of 
influential backers to help rally support (Feinsilver 32).  The latter was a conglomeration 
of members from various unions and large organizations brought together in order to 
support national health care programs, such as vaccination campaigns (Feinsilver 32).  
The first national vaccination operation took place in 1962, and members of the People’s 
Health Commissions were indispensable in vaccinating the entire population against 
Polio (Feinsilver 32).  By 1963 Cuba successfully eradicated Polio from its population, 
several years before the United States was able to do the same (Brotherton 2012: 71).  
Although the difference in population size is notable, such an accomplishment shortly 
after the new government’s formation is commendable.  Such large-scale efforts would 
never have succeeded without the unified support of the People’s Health Commissions, a 
forum in which non-medical community leaders and medical personnel could voice their 
concerns and produce a unified strategy.  This notion of grassroots support of 
Revolutionary goals is captured by Castro in 1961, “With the Revolution, everything; 
against the Revolution, nothing (Pillar 203).”  By mobilizing the support of the national 
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body to improve its own health, the government began delivering on its promises from 
the Revolution while proving that success was only achieved through the collective.  The 
government set the precedent that no major projects could succeed without the help of the 
people, especially in regard to health.  No longer did each Cuban body belong only to 
himself, but collectively they comprise the health of national body, which becomes a 
mechanism to validate the Revolution.   
The development and implementation of core health care values began in the late 
1950’s, but it was not until the 1976 Cuban Constitution and the 1983 Public Health Law 
that the following principles were formally adopted:  
• Health care is a right, available to all equally and free of charge. 
• Health care is the responsibility of the state. 
• Preventive and curative services are integrated. 
• The public participates in the health system’s development and functioning. 
• Health care activities are integrated with economic and social development. 
• Global health cooperation is a fundamental obligation of the health system and its 
professionals. (Cuba) 
The realization of these aspirations is found in the creation and subsequent success of the 
Medico de la familia8 system, which formally began in 1984 after the previous system, 
was deemed outdated and inefficient by the government (Ochoa: 56). The original 
system, the Rural Social Medical Service, began in 1960 with the creation of a law that 
incentivized new medical school graduates to practice in low-access areas.  The program 
offered graduates a competitive salary and a government medical position after 
                                                
8 English translation: Family doctor. 
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completing a six-month rural post (Ochoa: 56). This model had no trouble attracting 
physicians, as the “voluntary” program eventually saw 100% of graduates opting in to a 
two-year term of service.  This, along with improvements across the entire health care 
system, helped to greatly improve the health of the national body.  It especially improved 
in the health of the maternal and infant populations.  Prior to the Revolution, the infant 
mortality rate was 70 deaths per 1,000 live births (Brotherton 2012: 71).  The number 
plummeted; by 1980 it improved to 17 per 1,000 live births (World Bank).  Officials and 
health care providers found themselves in an unfamiliar position, with the ability to focus 
on maladies previously given less priority.  The dramatic improvement in once pervasive 
ailments moved the focus to prevention and treatment of “first world illnesses,” such as 
cardiovascular disease, high blood pressure, and cancer (Brotherton 2012: 80).  This 
system emphasized the importance of universally accessible health care to all Cuban 
citizens, not just those in urban centers. 
With the implementation of the Medico de la familia plan, also referred to as the 
“Physician for 120 Families” model, the country shifted its mentality from a system in 
which a large pool of specialists cured specific illnesses to one in which most physicians 
were general or family practitioners to provide comprehensive and preventative care to a 
very localized population.  This plan functions thanks to the more than 76,000 Cuban 
physicians who work domestically, or 6.9 physicians per 1000 Cubans (WHO).  The 
constant “over”-production of doctors, Cuba has maintained a robust health care work 
force to supply the ambitious program.  Cuba’s lack of resources does not seem to have 
greatly impacted Cuba’s ability to educate a large number of medical students.   
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Another testament to Cuba’s early dedication towards health care, the government 
expanded the biomedical education system as the need increased.  The figure below 
shows the relationship between the increasing physicians per capita ratio and medicals 
schools.9   
 
Appropriately, an increase in the number of medical schools foreshadowed an increase in 
physicians per capita.  Several years after the Revolution, in 1965, the physicians per 
capita ratio were only 0.88 and only increased modestly throughout the following decade.  
The 1970s marks the beginning of the education system’s expansion, triggering the 
subsequent spike in physicians. In the 1980’s the number of physicians exploded: 1.9, 
3.0, and 3.6 in 1984, 1988, and 1990, respectively (WHO).  A rapid increase could not 
have been expected prior to the 1980s, unless had the government decided to retrain 
Cubans from other sectors.  That decade marks the point in which children born in or 
                                                
9 Source: World Bank and Carreño de Celis et al. 
Physician ratio is the number of physicians per 1,000 citizens. 
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shortly thereafter the Revolution were able to complete their entire medical education and 
begin practicing medicine.  
 The pre-revolutionary system of health care was by and large replaced viewed as 
a success, measured quantitatively by nations and impartial observers across the world.  
Yet, it is not without its flaws, and critics raise questions that might expose some of its 
inefficiencies.  A major objective of the Medico de la familia system is that its physicians 
become embedded within their small community.  The argument is that once illnesses or 
disease-causing behaviors are discovered, their spread can be eliminated much more 
quickly in a community where the physician is a respected and well-connected figure.  
Yet, the family doctors’ skillset and knowledge can narrow from being consistent 
exposure to a small and constant population of only 120-150 families.  This could cause 
them to either losing their capability to treat or potentially misdiagnose relatively simply 
cases.  Additionally, superior health care provision and mass biomedical education 
campaigns over an extended period have created a national population with greater 
biomedical knowledge than most.   
 The current system is comprised of a hierarchical web of medical services that 
provide varying levels of care throughout the country.  It incorporates the entire range of 
medical doctors, from physicians trained in community medicine, to those subspecialists 
in large urban-based hospitals.  The basis of the entire system is built upon the 
neighborhood physician (from the Medico de la familia program) whose responsibility is 
to first diagnose the patient.  If the patient needs more specialized care, he is referred to a 
local polyclinic, each covering roughly 30,000 people.  Each polyclinic is staffed with 
several primary care specialists, several internists, a pediatrician, an obstetrician-
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gynecologist, a dentist, a nurse, and a social worker (Brotherton 2012: 69).  The structure 
of the system aims to improve efficiency via a pyramidal organization in which patients 
referrals are now directed “up the chain” in a methodical way in order to prevent an 
inundation of cases in the large hospitals (Labrador: 1). Though it should function 
smoothly in theory, the rigid hierarchy has inbuilt flaws, specifically in regards to 
accessing specialized care.  Under the current constraints, citizens who know they need to 
seek treatment from a specialist must still navigate through the bureaucracy, starting with 
their neighborhood doctor.  As the following narrative illustrates, in certain cases, Cuba’s 
system might overemphasize access to care delivered by the Medico de la familia model, 
greatly limiting direct access to biomedical care delivered by specialists. 
 
II. Personal Experiences: Strengths and Limitations of the Cuban System  
 My conversations with a Cuban expat, Carmen, who has lived in the United States 
since 2002, highlight the bureaucracy encountered once a patient needs treatment from a 
specialist.  After a period of six years of being unable to return to Cuba to visit her 
family, Carmen now makes regular trips to the island.  She has strong opinions 
concerning health care, confirming that (Cuban) biomedicine plays an integral and 
fundamental role in revolutionary culture on the island.  It is necessary to acknowledge 
the bias Carmen has against the Cuban government and communist party, ubiquitous 
among Cubans who have fled their native country, most of who immigrate to the United 
States.  Therefore, I present her opinion and narrative as a significant, yet specific, 
instance to provide insight into the inner workings of Cuban health care, which are not 
always ideal. Importantly, she also interacted with the health care system before, during, 
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and (briefly) after the período especial10, a reference point in Cuba’s modern history.  
The período especial was the period of time following the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
in 1989.  It was marked by severe economic crisis, and Cuba faced severe shortages in 
food and energy, forcing the government to ration the little that was available.  In 
December of 2004, Castro declared that Cuba was finally moving out of the período 
especial (Guerra and Vega 117). 
 Carmen explains that her grandmother, ill with Parkinson’s disease, was in need 
of care from specialized physicians located in only a few, select hospitals.  “If you didn’t 
have someone to get you into the hospitals, you were in trouble,” she explains, displaying 
her pessimism with the system which is supposed to provide equal care to all.  To 
navigate the Cuban state’s biomedical system, Carmen emphasizes the importance of 
being “well-connected,” or socialismo—where citizens must rely on networks of kinship 
and other forms of formal and informal relationships to acquire the health care access 
they need—in conjunction with the bureaucratic structure of state-sanctioned system 
(Brotherton 2012: 31).  After meeting with several different doctors at different hospitals 
with little success, Carmen’s grandmother did receive quality treatment.  However, this 
was only possible resulting from the connections that Carmen’s brother-in-law, has 
formed during his career as a dermatologist.  Fortunately, she was able to receive 
treatment at a hospital reserved for government officials and military personnel from the 
country’s expert in Parkinson’s disease, but, according to Carmen, this level of care is not 
one which all Cubans can attain.  Brotherton provides a similar narrative where a Cuban 
                                                
10 English translation: the Special Period.  This term is one that was incorporated into language by Cuban 
officials.  Though the phrase’s connotation attempts to ignore the great struggles faced, it carries a negative 
undertone for all Cubans. 
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man voices his concern that family physicians lack a depth of knowledge to treat complex 
cases.  His proposed solution is loosening tight regulations to direct access to specialists 
(2012: 107). 
 Carmen’s strong stance against the Cuban government is common among Cubans 
who have fled the island, most of who immigrate to the United States.  She sees many of 
the actions taken by the government to be secretive and difficult to understand.  Carmen 
voices concern about Cuba’s many international medical programs and the government’s 
lack of transparency regarding how revenue is used: 
 
What I see [now] is that they are selling our doctors but the resources that are 
coming in are not being used towards heath for Cuban people.  They’re being 
used for something else.  I don’t know where it’s going because I don’t see 
anything getting fixed.  The streets are full of holes, and people are not getting 
food.  So I really don’t know where this money is going.  You know that money is 
not going to the doctors; you know that.  This money is going straight to the 
government, and it’s not going to the hospitals in Cuba either.  I don’t know 
where it’s going, because as far as I’ve seen, I didn’t see that money going 
towards health care.  Otherwise these hospitals would have top of the line stuff.   
 
While Carmen acknowledges that she does not know where exactly income from bilateral 
agreements goes, she alludes that someone must be benefitting from the profit, perhaps 
high-ranking government officials.  While this could be a possibility, there are few 
accounts or commentary indicating that Cuba is a country where corruption is blatant and 
rampant.  While government employees and officials appear to receive perks, both 
official and unofficial, it is not comparable to countries where government officials 
unabashedly steal from state coffers.  Furthermore, Transparency International’s 2014 
corruption perceptions index score for Cuba was 46, placing it in the top third of all 
countries in the Americas, which illustrates its relative “cleanliness” in terms of 
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corruption.11  Therefore, poor investment strategies or mismanagement of funds in the 
weak Cuban economy could also be an answer to the alleged disappearance of funds. 
 Contrasting the difficulties and inefficacies above is the response from the Cuban 
medical community to a neuropathy epidemic.  This rapid and comprehensive response 
proved the efficacy of the Medico de la familia program during the período especial.  The 
average daily caloric intake sharply dropped from 2,899 calories (pre-crisis level) to 
1,863 calories during the worst part of the crisis, from 1990 to 1995 (Franco 1837).  The 
quick change in diet triggered a neuropathy stemming from a lack of vitamin B1, usually 
consumed through corn and other root vegetables (Mills 11).  Family doctors around 
Cuba became the keystone of the effort.  They were given the appropriate tools and 
resources from the country’s experts and directors to treat patients: new training on early 
symptoms and a vitamin supplement (Mills 13).  Although the availability of foodstuffs 
what uncontrollable, a quick, unified response by the Cuban medical community 
prevented a larger disaster. By utilizing Cuba’s army of physicians deployed in 
neighborhoods through the country, the incidence of neuropathological illnesses declined 
(Mills 13).  In sum, these accounts show that the structure Cuba’s health care system has 
is not perfect, and perhaps is not well-suited for certain illnesses, such as non-
communicable diseases that only affect a small portion of the population.  However, as a 
whole, the system is quite effective in identifying population-wide illnesses and quickly 
delivering a uniform response across the country. 
 
                                                
11 Transparency International ranked 175 countries and territories in 2014.  A 100 point scale is used, with 
100 indicating no corruption.  For comparison, Canada is ranked first in the Americas with a score of 81.  
Ecuador, 33, is in the bottom third and Venezuela, 19, is last. 
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III. Cuban International Medicine Today 
International service and experience is, surprisingly, an integral part of the entire 
Cuban health care system due to a high level of support and the honor Cubans receive 
while doing such work on behalf of the government.  Furthermore, it is an essential part 
of the Cuban biomedical pedagogy, in which philanthropic values are part of the 
program.  The importance of international service is evident in the large number of 
Cubans who travel abroad on behalf of the state.  Approximately 20,000 physicians are 
practicing abroad, which equates to roughly 1 out of every 560 Cuban citizens (De 
Albornoz 464).  This compares to the approximately 1 out of every 27,600 Americans 
who is working abroad with either the Peace Corps or USAID, the two largest 
governmental entities dedicated to foreign service (Peace Corps; USAID Staffing).  This 
notable difference shows that the Cuban program is mainstream.  Cubans work abroad as 
a part of their national identity, representing the Cuban government in a direct and 
intentional manner.  The American programs, however, are entities in of themselves.  
Their employees or volunteers are representatives of the organization, rather than the 
U.S. government.  This allows participants to separate their work from American foreign 
policy or actions, whereas Cubans cannot. 
Cuba portrays a level of altruism that any sovereign state seeks to reach, 
especially on the international stage. Even considering the many instances where Cuba 
delivers goods and services pro bono, it would be remiss to suggest that Cuba does not 
benefit from agreements made. Now that Cuba controls the market on medical 
“mercenaries,” Cuba’s profits from international biomedical agreements and aid packages 
will only continue to grow.  Cuban officials have smartly emphasized the “revolutionary” 
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aspect of “revolutionary medicine,” and its physicians embody and incorporate it into 
their practice of medicine.  Cuba portrays itself as the principled and ethically-minded 
communist state in contrast to the capitalistic West that does not provide medical aid in 
this manner.  Cuba’s actions commodify the initially intangible revolutionary principles 
Che and Castro extolled.  By utilizing the vast physician population within Cuba as a 
source of financial gain, the nation also receives an income of symbolic capital, what 
Feinsilver defines as “goodwill, influence, and prestige (86).” Perhaps even more 
significant, these can later be converted into financial and political capital.  The 
institutionalized system of exporting human capital as well as scientific knowledge has 
consequences both explicit and implicit. The Cuban government emphasizes this system 
of international altruism exists for ideological reasons; but aren’t countries paying for the 
biomedical services provided by Cuban physicians, not Cuban Revolutionary dogma?  
No, whether foreign governments acknowledge the fact or not (the United States does), it 
is impossible to separate the services delivered from the ideological basis on which they 
are founded.  The biomedical training and culture within Cuba combine science with the 
beliefs of the government.  This is a principal part of how Cuba has seen long-term 
success in delivering its medicine abroad. 
Soon after the new revolutionary government began work on improving health 
care domestically, the international realm became a new interest for Cuban officials.  
International medical brigades began as early as 1960 to Chile following an earthquake 
(Feinstein 2010: 87).  Many of these early missions went to countries in Africa such as 
Algeria and various parts of sub-Saharan Africa following natural disasters or during 
periods of conflict (Brouwer 2009: 33).  Cuban medical teams that went to such areas 
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began to notice and feel that many of the disaster sites would need medical attention long 
after the initial shocks of the disaster dissipated. What first began as medical missions to 
areas affected by disaster converted into a program to provide free medical services for a 
longer period.  Only three years later, the first instance of an extended presence of Cuban 
physicians occurred in Algeria following its independence (Brotherton 2012:169). 
By 2005, Cuba had sent over 200,000 medical professionals to 94 different 
countries since the first medical brigade to Chile (Harris 36-37).  Data from the Cuban 
government and confirmed by the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that 
there are currently more than 50,000 Cuban-trained health care workers12 in 66 countries 
("Cuban Medical Team Heading for Sierra Leone"). During Ebola outbreak in western 
Africa, Cuba was the first country to send a group of physicians and health care 
providers, approximately 200, to help combat the virus’ spread.  During a joint Cuban-
World Health Organization press conference the Director-General praised the Cuban 
government saying, “Cuba is world-famous for its ability to train outstanding doctors and 
nurses and for its generosity in helping fellow countries on the route to progress (WHO 
Welcomes Cuban Doctors for Ebola Response in West Africa).” The financially strapped 
country again revolutionized medicine, in a way that no other country could, by 
capitalizing on a seemingly endless supply of physicians already being produced in 
“excess” from Cuba’s medical schools as a source of national revenue.  Although Cuba 
first began sending medical personnel abroad free of charge, the government found that 
perhaps it could be a lucrative venture as well, complicating the initial humanitarian 
                                                
12 This number includes non-Cubans who received health care training at one of the several Cuban univer-
sities that teach both Cubans and foreigners alike.  
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underpinnings of the program.  Yet, that is not to imply that Cuba no longer provides its 
services pro bono.  
 Most reputable sources report that Cuba currently has approximately 20,000 
Cuban physicians practicing abroad, with slightly more than half stationed in Venezuela 
(De Albornoz 464; Brouwer 2011: 37)13.  This number is in addition to the more than 
76,000 Cuban physicians practicing within the country, or over 6.9 physicians per 1000 
people, a figure second only to Monaco (WHO).  Figure 3 illustrates the relative 
physician supplies of Cuba, Ecuador, and the United States.14 
 
Cuba clearly broke away from the group in the 1980s, while Ecuador and the U.S. 
have only made slight gains.  With only slightly more than 11 million people, this ratio 
provides Cubans with a dramatic excess, relatively speaking, of medically trained 
personnel; therefore, commodifying this vast resource of highly skilled human capital is 
                                                
13 The date of this statistic is key, as it dates to Venezuela before President Chavez’s death.  Ensuing eco-
nomic, political, and social instability threatens Cuba’s desire and/or ability to maintain such a high popula-
tion there. 
14 Source: World Bank 
Physician ratio is the number of physicians per 1,000 citizens. 
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quite pragmatic.  Another potential source of Cuba’s large physician pool is the prestige 
it offers.  Since all salaries are managed by the national government, the lure of high pay 
seen in other countries is not present.  The prestige of the medical profession, which is 
arguably universal, is perhaps even higher for Cubans, resulting from the overwhelming 
positive reputation domestically and abroad.  
  Although the United States’ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
and State Department played an active role in strategic efforts, no American government 
department has sent health care personnel to administer to the infected population.  The 
Cuban government has publicly stated that it is open to a joint Cuban-American strategy 
and action, considering that the United States is the largest financial supporter in the 
cause.  U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry made no mention of meeting with Cuban 
officials to create a united front, but he did acknowledge Cuba’s large-scale effort 
(Castillo).  The intersection Cuba and the United States seem to dance around raises 
questions about the American rational for avoiding cooperation with Cuba.  It is only 
logical that they come together to better utilize their resources in the fight.  The White 
House has sent officials from the CDC, USAID, and State Department to West Africa 
charged with response efforts of “surveillance, contact tracing, data management, 
laboratory testing, and health education.”  As of November of 2014, the US had 
committed more than $350 million, with the Department of Defense prepared to pledge 
another $1 billion (The White House).  But Cuba’s physical donation of hundreds of 
Cuban health care workers has gained much attention.  Cuba’s response with actual 
physicians who come in direct patient contact, undermines the more distant strategic and 
financial American response.  
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CHAPTER FIVE:  
MEDICAL DIPLOMACY AND (INTER)NATIONAL BODIES 
 
I. Internationalism  
 By marketing itself and establishing a strong reputation of high medical aptitude, 
Castro was able to access nearly any “inferior” national body, through the 
implementation of its system of medical diplomacy.  In turn, this allowed Cuba to 
circumvent both the American anti-communism ideology leading up to and during Cold 
War era, as well as the American hegemonic system of foreign intervention in the 1990s 
via the “Washington Consensus”(Russell 44).  Cuban physicians not only deliver Cuban 
biomedicine to targeted bodies, but also act as ambassadors who practice their profession 
in a politicized environment.  Cuba has never explicitly stated that the objective of its 
medical diplomacy missions is to ignite socialist or communist revolutions within other 
nations, but one must take into account the populations in which these Cubans serve.  
Most often, foreign governments, such as Ecuador, contract them to practice within 
populations who have traditionally been ignored due to a combination of factors: race, 
ethnicity, geographic location, and/or misperception.  Thus, these devalued groups are 
more vulnerable and therefore open to foreigners who provide them with biomedical care 
that they have been unable to access previously. 
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 Cuba currently receives much of its financial compensation from Venezuela, 
receiving $9.4 billion from the trading partner in 2008.  Fifty-nine percent of this income 
is the wages paid by the Venezuelan government to Cuba for the services of medical 
personnel and other professionals such as teachers (Mesa-Lago 10).  Clearly, Venezuela 
demonstrates its solidarity with Cuba through its commitment to compensate Cuba in 
such a significant way.  Yet perhaps even more notable is Venezuela’s daily exportation 
of nearly 100,000 barrels of crude oil at a greatly discounted rate (included in the $9.4 
billion), illustrating the strong ties forged between the late Chavez and Castro.  This 
bilateral network created between the two charismatic leaders has led to a translation of 
socialist or communist ideals into tangible products.  Cubans are able to live a more 
comfortable, modern life (relatively speaking) with a more reliable source of energy, 
while marginalized Venezuelans are allowed greater access to (Cuban) health care in 
localized settings.  The agreements between Venezuela and Cuba are not simply trade 
agreements between two countries.  These are actions of solidarity between two 
developing nations who now rely on each other heavily. 
I argue that this gifting of oil has greater symbolic value due to the significance 
Chávez placed on his country’s valuable resource.  Through Chávez’s implementation of 
a socialist agenda, including negating previous neoliberal reforms supported by the 
United States, Venezuelan oil has become a symbol of reconfigured Venezuelan 
nationalism created and grown under Chavez.  Chavez’s Venezuela has come to be 
associated not only with oil, but with oil that comes from a country that consistently 
challenges the West. It is only fitting that Cuba import Venezuelan oil that is intrinsically 
richer than the typical chemical properties normally allow. Cuba appears continues these 
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trade agreements not only for financial gains, but also the intangible benefits produced, 
which may be reconstructed and used alongside traditional means of financial capital.  
Cuba creates a reputation for itself as a country that others can mimic and rely on for 
medical resources—both tangible (physicians) and intangible (knowledge and ideology).   
In 2006 Cuba received roughly $2.3 billion in revenue by providing medical 
services abroad, including exporting of physicians.  This accounted for approximately 28 
percent of total export revenue that year (Feinsilver 2010: 98).  Ritter calculates that the 
combination of health workers, pharmaceuticals, and other biotechnology in 2007 
accounted for about 37 percent of total exports (as cited in Andaya 368).  A strikingly 
less conservative report estimated that Cuba received $9.9 billion in 2009 in exchange of 
sending medical personnel15 abroad (Kirk 86).  The most recent figure available estimates 
that Cuba receives $7.6 billion annually (Walter).  It is impossible to ignore the influx of 
money these physicians provide the Cuban government with, despite the fact that it is not 
the main rational for maintaining a system of medical diplomacy. 
Critics of the Cuban international medical system argue that financial 
compensation is the basis of and motivation for sustaining the program.  These arguments 
do merit attention, considering Cuba receives a significant compensation for many of its 
international medical programs.  However, this was not the initial impetus of the 
program.  This source of income grew over time, and has now amounted to a notable 
sum.  Any shrewd country or business knows to capitalize on a resource when available, 
and during the special period, Cuba was especially needy.  It since has continued to be an 
                                                
15 I use this more generalized term to signify physicians as well as other medical professionals such as den-
tists, nurses, nurse assistants, etc.  Some data collected utilizes this broader category to capture data rather 
than specifics concerning physicians. 
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important source of income.  Simply because there is financial motivation, it does not 
meant the idealistic goals are contradicted or negated.  In sum, Cuba can profit from the 
program while maintaining its integrity.   
 
II. Effects of the U.S. Embargo 
Why is Cuba so concerned about maintaining a reputation of superior health care?  
For one specific perspective, I again turn to my interview with Carmen.  Fortunately, 
Carmen has also been able to rely on her mother’s older historical perspective to 
supplement her own memory, offering a survey since the Revolution’s beginnings.   
Regarding the current status of domestic health care in Cuba, in her opinion, Carmen 
definitively argues that it has deteriorated, but it is one of the few things Cubans can still 
be proud of.  She attributes the system’s decline to the fall of the Soviet Bloc and the 
subsequent crisis of the período especial.  Cuba abruptly stopped receiving money, 
medical supplies, technology, and knowledge (through personnel who would travel to 
Cuba).  Even though the embargo has existed since the 1960’s, only until after the 
período especial did it become a life-threatening issue.  It compounded the crisis by 
discouraging countries and companies around the world from selling to Cuba through 
various trade laws. 
According to a joint report from the Washington Office on Latin America and 
Oxfam America, Cuba’s shortage of biomedical technology was inevitable.  Carmen, 
explains that when Cuba was supported by the Soviet Union, the lack of access to 
medical supplies was merely a large inconvenience, rarely life-threatening.  
Unsurprisingly, the American legal restrictions enforced, which have no legal standing in 
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Cuba, produce the desired effect (by American officials) of not only applying to 
American citizens, but also any foreign national who conducts business with any United 
States citizen or business.  One such example is the instance of a foreign vessel that 
docks in Cuban waters or ports.  Regardless of intent or purpose (such as refueling), that 
vessel is legally unable to dock in an American port for the purposes of engaging in trade 
for six months (United States: 17). 
Therefore, Cuba’s largest hurdle in preventing it from entering the modern era is 
the United States’ embargo.  Through the complex and well-planned humanitarian-based 
system (with clear political underpinnings), Cuba has gained overwhelming support in 
pressuring the United States to lift the embargo across the geopolitical spectrum: 
 
It [Cuba’s recognized success via medical diplomacy] also has contributed 
to Support for Cuba and rebuke of the United States in the UN General 
Assembly, where for the past eighteen consecutive years members voted 
overwhelmingly in favor of lifting the U.S. embargo of Cuba. In fact‚only 
Israel and Palau have supported the U.S. position, and the Marshall Islands 
and Micronesia abstained.  With equal voting rights for all members of the 
UN General Assembly, Cuba’s medical diplomacy with such a large 
number of member states is a rational endeavor, however humanitarian the 
impetus may be (Feinsilver 2010: 97). 
 
As seen though the UN General Assembly annual vote, Cuba has overwhelming 
support to lift the embargo.  Feinstein emphasizes that without such a monumental 
expression of goodwill and humanitarianism realized in Cuba’s medical diplomacy, there 
would be little to no support for lifting the embargo. 
The embargo is not simply an inconvenience, but greatly limits what goods and 
technologies are available on the island.  The key role American pharmaceutical and 
biomedical companies hold within the global biomedical community limits the resources 
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available in Cuba.  Prostaglandin, the preferred drug by obstetricians for inducing labor 
was previously only produced by Upjohn (no longer in existence), an American 
pharmaceutical company, forcing Cuban physicians to rely on other medications which 
carried higher risks for both the infant and mother (“Myths And Facts” 2).  The director 
of one Cuban maternity hospital explains that the “replacement” drug, an oxytocin, is 
incredibly inferior compared to the prostaglandin standard.  Oxytocins carry greater risk 
for both mother and child, with risks of uterine rupture, amniotic fluid embolism, and 
fetal distress or fetal compromise (Reed and Frank 144).  Other barriers to modern 
biomedical care within Cuba include replacing faulty parts to equipment or non-reusable 
materials (such as X-ray film) (“Myths And Facts” 2).  Cuba has little recourse to procure 
materials it cannot from the United States.  One tactic is to produce American owned 
pharmaceuticals within their own production sites.  Unlike other countries, the United 
States has no leverage to prevent Cuba from breaking American patents.  There are 
simply few remaining sanctions the White House could implement to discourage such 
actions.  Therefore, if the technology exists in Cuba, domestic production is one avenue 
to acquire goods.  The other, more frequent, option is to purchase products from 
companies not based in the US who are willing to sell to Cuba.  The prices are often 
higher due to the trade-related repercussions they face from the United States. 
Despite the economic barriers the U.S. embargo employs, Cuba has made the best 
out of the situation, at least in regards to health care.  By displaying both its medical skill 
set and ideology, the world overwhelming approves of the former, creating the perception 
that the United States refuses to move out of an outdated mindset, regardless of the 
embargo’s toll upon Cuba’s silent citizens.  Another advantage for Cuba is the attraction 
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of partners in solidarity, such as Ecuador, that view Cuba’s strong stance against the 
United States as a sign of courage and fortitude.  This maneuvering by Cuba is not 
coincidental but a calculated process in which the Cuban government positions itself as 
the humble “healer of the world,” but still mistreated by its powerful neighbor to the 
north.  
 
III. Cuban (Inter)national Biomedical Education 
The sheer number of physicians Cuba educates in its medical schools is a 
testament to the Cuban biomedical education process.  Even more noticeable is the fact 
that Cuba retains most of the physicians it educates.  Brain drain16is a serious problem 
that Cuba has been able to combat, and it now helps fellow developing countries ward 
off.  Cuba uses its international medical school, ELAM (Escuela Latinoamierca de 
Medicina) to translate the country’s success in health care domestically into an 
international program from which other countries can learn (Brotherton 2012: 172). 
Many students who attend ELAM come from developing countries where brain 
drain is a concern among governments.  Specifically, brain drain plays a significant role 
in physician migratory patterns from the global South (where they are born) to the global 
North (where they eventually work) (Aluwihare 15).  The temptations for physicians 
from underdeveloped countries to emigrate, economically speaking, are not surprising.  
Typically, physicians decide to migrate to “richer” countries located in the global North, 
in order to “better themselves financially—usually a major factor; for greater job 
satisfaction, research, and other facilities (Aluwihare 16).”  However, research shows that 
                                                
16 A term originally developed by the Royal Society to explain the phenomenon of British scientists mov-
ing to the United States mainly due to better financial compensation.  
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other factors encourage the potentially migrant population to leave the country, and other 
forces that lure the same population out, known as push and pull forces.  Without the 
combination of both forces, the likelihood of significant migratory patterns is greatly 
diminished (Mejia 15).  
 The lack of technology and resources are usually considered a severe 
disadvantage within the field of medicine.  In an interview that I conducted, one 
Ecuadorian physician criticized the educational formation of Cuban physicians, citing 
their poor technological skills as the reason for failing to quickly incorporate themselves 
into foreign health care systems.  Health care is not immune to the US embargo, and its 
effects are visible through the lack of modern equipment and technological knowhow.  
However, in areas where Cuba simply cannot succeed, such as technology, it makes up 
for in other ways of knowledge production.  Although it is not developing cutting-edge 
health care technology, it maintains a committed pool of researchers and educators. Cuba 
would not be able to train its large population of physicians who are effective by many 
measures.  Some argue that the incorporation of biomedical technologies into the health 
care field does not always guarantee positive results, particularly in societies where 
access to such technologies is not pervasive.  Moral and ethical dilemmas arise when 
clinicians and government officials must chose who receives certain treatments and who 
is left out (Good 395).  Therefore, perhaps the seemingly detrimental lack of technology 
within Cuba releases its practitioners from a burden others must often face in developing 
countries. 
The number of Cuban physicians who have chosen to defect to either the United 
States or their host country is quite small when compared to the total number that have 
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practiced abroad 1960s.  In 2006 American officials created a formal system that allowed 
Cuban physicians practicing outside of Cuba to enter the United States.  The Cuban 
Medical Professional Parole (CMPP) Program allows for Cuban medical professionals 
and their families to leave their posts abroad and migrate the United States where they 
can reside and apply for permanent residency.  Within the few years, the program has 
gained traction.  In 2014 (fiscal year) 1,278 Cuban medical professionals were admitted 
into the United States under the CMPP (NYT Editorial Board).  However, once cleared to 
enter, this does not give physicians or nurses license to practice in the U.S.; frequently, 
Cubans chose a profession that requires less schooling than their original, as the 
accreditation process in the U.S. for some foreigners is lengthy and expensive.  More 
important is what these actions reveal about the United States’ underlying motives.  The 
United States’ attempt to take in the medical professionals does not exist in a vacuum; the 
consequences of a defection do not affect Cuba and the United States alone.  American 
efforts imply that the humanitarian efforts that the Cubans staff are either not valid or 
insignificant.  The potential reduction of the pool of Cuban physicians by the United 
States for reasons largely stemming from pride is unlikely to meet sympathy in the 
foreign governments who utilize the resource. 
The prestige and desire to help marginalized groups in other countries via 
biomedical practices is the primary motivation for traveling abroad on behalf of the 
Cuban government. Che’s speech centering upon el hombre nuevo both predicate and 
reinforce such sentiments felt by Cuban physicians: 
 
Meanwhile, the economic foundation has done its work of undermining 
the development of consciousness. In order to build communism, 
simultaneously with the material foundations, the new man must be made.  
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Hence, it is very important to choose the correct instrument for mobilizing 
the masses. This instrument must be moral in nature, fundamentally, 
without forgetting the proper use of material incentives, especially social 
nature.  
 
As I said, in moments of great peril it is easy to boost moral incentives; in 
order to maintain its validity, it is necessary to develop a consciousness in 
which the values acquire new categories. Society as a whole must be 
converted into a gigantic school. 
 
This figurative and literal creation of el hombre nuevo is realized through the biomedical 
actions by Cuban doctors stationed in foreign areas, an indirect result from this concept 
fundamental to the Cuban health care system both domestic and abroad.  Che’s idealistic 
theory does have direct consequences upon the biomedical educational system that relies 
on a pedagogical cycle based upon reciprocity to society at large.  “Having accepted the 
state’s gift of medical training, new generations of socialist doctors were honor bound to 
reciprocate through their self-sacrificing and unending commitment to the uplift of the 
masses and their dedication to the ideals of the revolution” (Andaya 363).  Here, the idea 
of what it means to be a physician while embodying el hombre nuevo relates to the 
greater mission under communist Cuba.  The humanitarian philosophy that Cuban 
medical personnel come to represent has a direct effect in maintaining the revolution.  
Cuban physicians are socialized into a specific community that prides itself on the 
embodiment of Che’s ideologies, perpetuating the environment for future generation of 
physicians.  Furthermore, not only does it continue Che and Castro’s mission, but it 
serves as a mechanism for propagation to the global South. 
Once such example is the system of medical training through ELAM that 
redefines traditional medical training by educating students from nontraditional 
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backgrounds who will become physicians solely for developing countries.  Many of these 
new physicians will practice in areas such as Africa and Asia, where they will learn how 
to modify their techniques to specific localities (Kirk 81).  Thus, through Cuba’s 
continued exportation of biomedical services to allies and non-allies, the island’s 
government also contributes towards the local biomedical (public) health base of 
knowledge when other governments borrow and modify specific educational processes 
that remain fundamentally Cuban.   
Cuba educates many of its medical students at ELAM, an institution that 
transplants the Cuban biomedical mission permanently onto foreign soil.  In 1999, 
following Hurricane Mitch, ELAM was established in Cuba, charged with the mission of 
educating not only Cuban students, but aspiring physicians from across Latin America 
(Feinsilver 2013: 114).  Since the school’s founding, it has graduated nearly 20,000 
students since the first graduation in 2005 (The Rep. of Cuba “Historia de la ELAM”).  
Once students complete their education in Cuba, they return to their home countries to 
practice.  Although the school has educated students from 74 different countries, its 
mission is to target disadvantaged students within the region, with students come from 
countries already associated with Cuba, such as Ecuador and other ALBA members. (The 
Rep. of Cuba “Historia de la ELAM”).   
In July 2014, 31 Ecuadorians graduated from one of Cuba’s medical schools in 
Santiago de Cuba, excited to come back and practice in Ecuador (“31 Ecuatorianos Se 
Gradúan”).  In an interview with a public health instructor who has spent extensive time 
conducting research in Cuba, Dr. Williams, she noted that the defining quality that the 
Cuban medical education system offers its students is not the biomedical training 
   
 53 
specifically; rather the ethical code and ideology which is imbedded within the Cuban 
curriculum.  Dr. Williams, an American public health expert who has spent extensive 
time in Cuba, emphasized that Cuban physicians are trained that the best place to practice 
their skill is the place where it is most needed.  Even better is the community doctor who 
is already an integral part of that community—a homologue to Cuba’s own Medico de la 
familia program.  One of the recent Ecuadorian graduates emphasized his comprehensive 
biomedical formation, “Physicians of science and morals graduate from this beautiful 
island, prepared to serve those most in need, in any part of the world (“31 Ecuatorianos 
Se Gradúan”).”  Ecuador as a nation benefits from students who leave their training with 
viewpoints as these; they are the students more likely to serve in Ecuador’s most needed 
areas.  For this reason the Cuban system places a strong emphasis on not only educating 
its own students, but students across the global South. 
Today there continues to be a notable concentration on students from Bolivia and 
Venezuela, as formal agreements specifically benefitting students from these two 
countries give these students a priority (Feinsilver 2013: 114).  In 2006, Bolivia 
accounted for more than 20% of the total foreign medical student population at ELAM.  
Perhaps due to the even stronger ties between Castro and Chavez, the Venezuelan 
president attended the first graduation from ELAM, where he made the grand 
announcement that there would be a Cuban-Venezuelan agreement to open a second 
Latin American medical school in Venezuela with the combined goal of producing 
100,000 physicians within ten years (Feinsilver 2013: 114).  Venezuela, and even 
Bolivia, has a relatively long tradition of formal agreements between itself and Cuba, 
often lying outside the scope of health care.  On the other hand, Ecuador is fairly new in 
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its alignment with Cuba, but new bilateral agreements have shown that plans biomedical 
cooperation on a significant scale are already solidified.  With the passing of Chavez and 
the ensuing instability under President Maduro, Ecuador has the potential to become the 
new Venezuela for Cuba.   
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CHAPTER 6: CASE STUDY:  
CUBANS IN ECUADOR 
 
I. Ecuador: Health Care Woes 
 The present health care system in Ecuador consists of a hodgepodge of four 
separate systems which attempt to provide healthcare to the entire country: public, social 
security, military, and private, that have been described as “fragmented” and “duplicated” 
(USAID).  Regarding medical education for physicians within Ecuador, the system is not 
nearly as comprehensive as that of Cuba’s.  Medical students are in an environment 
where specialization gains prestige.  Whereas family doctors fight negative perceptions in 
many countries of the global North, the distinction between specialists and general 
practitioners in Ecuador is even greater.  Simply put, general practitioners within Ecuador 
are considered poorly trained and looked down upon by their peers (Candib 278). 
 Herein lies the problem—the medical community does not provide the symbolic 
prestige that general practitioners deserve, which has negative consequences for the 
Ecuadorian national body.  These physicians are not provided with any further training 
after their graduation from medical school, unlike in Cuba, the United States, and Europe.  
Therefore, comparatively, they are rather poorly equipped.  This has led to a 
disproportionately small pool of general practitioners able to provide health care to 
Ecuadorians in rural areas (Candib 278).  The only exception to this pattern is the 
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obligatory año rural, where Ecuadorian medical students must practice for one year in a 
rural determined by the Ecuadorian government.  Afterwards, the more “prestigious” path 
is to specialize in another field of biomedicine (Candib 278).  Discrimination towards the 
rural population and distrust between socioeconomic levels also play roles in influencing 
where physicians choose to practice.  In contrast to Cuba where socioeconomic 
differences are relatively small, Ecuador is still a society based upon ethnicity, 
geography, and socioeconomic status.   
In Ecuador, as in many countries, divisions along class lines are sharp: the top 
10% earns more than 35% of total income, whereas the bottom 20% only earn 4.3% of 
total income in the country (World Bank).  The distinction between rural and urban 
citizens provides even greater insight into Ecuador’s health care woes.  In cities and 
suburbs, 17.6% of citizens fall below the national poverty line.  In contrast, closer to half, 
42%, of rural Ecuadorians live below the national poverty line (World Bank).  The 
indigenous population is slightly more than 1 million Ecuadorians, approximately 7% of 
the national population.  Geography is closely related to ethnicity; 78.5% of the 
indigenous population lives in rural areas, making nearly 15% of the rural population 
indigenous.  Although this might seem low, the only larger demographic in rural Ecuador 
is the mestizo population, which comprises 65% of the rural population (The Rep. of 
Ecuador, Census).  
It is essential to reiterate that Ecuadorian census data regarding race are self-
reported and therefore statistics may not accurately illustrate the reality of population 
demographics.  Ecuadorians who are indigenous, for all intents and purposes, who do not 
want formally identify as such, may choose to classify themselves as any other ethnicity.  
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Indigenous to mestizo is likely the most common pattern of “crossing over,” due to the 
wide range of physical characteristics within the mestizo category.  From an outsider’s 
perspective, many Ecuadorians who consider themselves mestizo might appear 
indigenous and even speak Kichwa, the main indigenous language.  Racism towards the 
indigenous population and the societal stratification that the whitening of skin plays, are 
ways in which some indigenous might find the “mestizo” classification more appealing.  
In 2005, nearly 40% of the indigenous population was considered to live in extreme 
poverty, compared to only 8.2% of the mestizo population (Perfil De Sistema De Salud 
9).  Rural (often indigenous) Ecuadorians suffer from higher rates of illness and disease, a 
testament to their low socioeconomic status.  A 2005 study concluded that 23% of 
children under five years old were chronically malnourished, and in rural Ecuador, it rose 
to 31% (3).  Maternal health is also in poorer condition in rural areas; only 26.4% of rural 
women received postpartum care in comparison to 44.4% of their urban counterparts (4).   
 The broken medical education system perpetuates the inequalities between the 
rural and urban populations, where the former are in greater need of health care, 
evidenced by their poorer measures of health.  In terms of access to improved sanitation 
sources, 86% of rural areas have access, while 96% of urban areas have such access 
(WHO).17  Since coming to power in 2007, President Correa has sought to correct these 
imbalances.  When first taking office, he instituted a ten-month state of emergency in 
which the government added an addition $225 million to improve health care centers 
(clinics and hospitals), equipment, and to hire 4,500 extra staff members.  The president 
                                                
17 Improved sanitation facilities include flush/pour flush to either piped sewer systems, septic tanks, pit 
latrines, ventilated improved pits latrine, pit latrine with slab, or composting toilet. 
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also planned to integrate the public health care sector by combining the social security 
system with the existing system under the Ministry of Health (Silva 228).  
 Despite attempts to diminish differences between rural and urban zones, the 
disparities still exist.  Regarding ease of access, two main types of facilities staffed with 
physicians exist in Ecuador: the health center and the health subcenter.  The former 
contains diagnostic equipment, such as medical imaging equipment and a larger staff, 
while the latter is staffed by a single physician, a dentist, and a nurse with only basic 
resources.  According to the Ecuadorian Ministry of Health, there are 783 rural and 599 
urban health subcenters.  This shows a real effort to improve access to the rural 
population, which increased from 669 in 2001 (The Rep. of Ecuador, “Statistics” 2011: 
19; 2001).  However, the larger health centers are located nearly exclusively in urban 
areas.  There are only 9 rural health centers compared to 193 urban ones.  Such a large 
difference in access to facilities with relatively simple diagnostic equipment emphasizes 
the imbalance.  The same data shows that out of the 24,247 physicians in Ecuador, only 
8.4% work in a rural setting where nearly one-third of its citizens reside.  Additionally, 
only 15% of all medical cases involving a physician took place in a rural area. 
 Correa acknowledges the great disparities within the health care system, partly 
blaming the mindset of Ecuadorian physicians, who tend to align themselves with 
capitalist values.  In September 2013, the Ecuadorian president signed a formal 
agreement with the Cuban government to import 1,000 Cuban physicians specializing in 
family practice, or community medicine, to boost the longstanding shortage in Ecuador 
(Array).  This bilateral agreement pays Cuba $30 million annually, upsetting many 
Ecuadorian physicians.  The Ecuadorian physicians argue that such a large sum could 
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have paid for many more Ecuadorian citizens to be trained in community medicine rather 
than paying for a smaller group of foreign physicians.  Correa maintains that it will not 
replace local doctors, but rather supplement the pool of physicians available (AFP).  In 
November of 2013, the Ecuadorian government confirmed that this agreement was going 
to materialize, announcing that the first 200 Cubans would arrive sometime in January of 
2014.18  They will help in forming part of the 5,000 physicians (1,000 who will be 
Cubans), charged with providing medical services to the areas that are in dire need (“200 
Médicos”). 
 During my semi structured conversation with a general practitioner, Dr. Garcia, at 
a small private clinic, Dr. Garcia also expressed concern about the large number of 
Cubans entering the public health care system in her country. 
 
I don’t think that it is necessary for Cuban physicians to come to Ecuador.  Here 
we have sufficient personnel, very capable and committed to their work.  We have 
open doors for colleagues who wish to practice within our country, working 
honestly and responsibly, but we don’t want extemporaneous professionals to 
come and experiment on our people. 
 
The medical profession has a long tradition that its central principal is the notion of care 
and compassion for mankind, evidence by the Hippocratic oath.  Throughout my 
conversations with Dr. Garcia, I am confident that she too values this tenet, but she also 
values her profession as an Ecuadorian.  Even though the arrival of Cuban physicians 
undermines the job security of Ecuadorian physicians, Dr. Garcia also sees their arrival as 
a potential threat to the Ecuadorian patients they will serve.  Furthermore, she emphasizes 
                                                
18 They did not arrive until August 2014.  96 arrived to join another 120 who had already been in Ecuador.  
The latter group does not appear to have arrived resulting from talks during 2013, but some unspecified 
time prior (The Rep. of Cuba “Reciben a nueva”). 
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that the Correa administration should not spend money abroad, but should instead invest 
it within its own population.   
The Ecuadorian Federation of Doctors (Federacaión Médica Ecuatoriana) also 
emphasizes the point that the logical approach is to educate one’s own citizens before 
contracting a foreign service.  I argue, though, that President Correa is not as concerned 
with who is providing medical attention to his impoverished citizens, but rather that they 
are receiving the attention they need as quickly as possible.  Although, by using Cuban 
physicians, President Correa continues to strengthen the Ecuadorian-Cuban relationship.  
Additionally, Cubans “specialize” in providing this type of biomedical care—community 
medicine—in environments accustomed to shortages and few resources.   
In sum, physicians who prefer to practice in an urban, affluent setting are given 
little incentive from society to relocate to an area where the population might be 
stereotyped as “backwards.”  The problem is compounded by the fact fewer resources are 
available in rural areas.  Therefore, the disparities between rich and poor, urban and rural, 
as well as between ethnicities, provides President Correa with the political ammunition to 
go forward with the Cuban-Ecuadorian agreement. Correa is laying down the foundation 
for health care reforms in Ecuador that will potentially model the domestic system Cuba 
has in place.  The agreement also serves as a clear signal that Ecuador intends on forging 
even stronger ties with Cuba, and recent developments indicate that more cooperation 
will indeed occur.  In November 2014, the Ecuadorian Foreign Minister traveled to 
Havana where he met with his Cuban counterpart.  Upon leaving, they announced that 
Ecuador would be building three new production plants with Cuba’s help.  The new 
   
 61 
plants will manufacture agriculture goods, medicines, and vaccination, an indication that 
the biopolitical ideologies of both nations in the future will continue to converge. 
 
II. Controversies and Context: The Año Rural Reconfigured 
 As the Correa administration continues to revamp and restructure the Ecuadorian 
health care system to emulate that of Cuba’s, one aspect of the current system that has 
been criticized is the Año Rural.  There are two straightforward remedies for the current 
problems within the system.  One would be to provide the young physicians stationed in 
the various clinics with the necessary equipment and supplies for greater efficacy in their 
work.  It is probable that this is already a goal that the government will continue to work 
towards, regardless of any additional changes.  A second change involves a personnel 
readjustment—instead of placing recently graduated doctors in settings that add 
additional pressures, employing physicians who are more experienced and already 
accustomed to such pressures could produce higher measures of health—importing the 
Cubans.  The Ecuadorian government claims that the primary rationale for their arrival is 
to increase access to biomedical care to areas with poor access (“Médicos De Ecuador Se 
Oponen a Contratación De Galenos Cubanos”).  The actual placement of these new 
imports has yet to be publicized. 
 Ecuador began its rural medical program in 1970 with the passage of legislation 
that created the medicatura rural, now known as the año rural program (Cavender and 
Albán 1937).  Unlike other governments that have systems that provide varying 
incentives for working in a rural setting, Ecuador’s law took a different approach.  It 
required that all recently graduated medical students fulfill the program’s requirements 
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before applying for national certification (1938).  Because licensure occurs after, the 
physicians within the año rural program are technically practicing unlicensed, refining 
their craft on populations with no other biomedical access.  Such a system devalues the 
rural (often indigenous) population by relegating their biomedical needs to a lower 
classification.  True, the Ecuadorian government does acknowledge the disparities 
between the populations, but the system is structured so care is not delivered efficiently.  
It continues to rely on physicians who simply do not yet have the adequate training to 
properly tend to their local patients.  The stated goal of inserting Cuban physicians into 
these areas could potentially alleviate some pressure from the young Ecuadorian 
physicians while improving the Ecuadorian governmental image within the population.  
The effort to staff clinics with long-term doctors, relatively speaking, portrays a better 
image than the current stop-gap approach where physicians are not allowed time to 
become rooted within the community. 
 A survey of physicians during their año rural year during the 1990’s reinforces 
this notion of poor preparation.  57% of respondents reported no type of orientation prior 
to the beginning of their service.  Additionally, another 16% acknowledged that they did 
participate in an orientation program, but they found it unsatisfactory (Cavender and 
Albán 1940).  Any physician with Ecuadorian citizenship who wishes to practice in 
Ecuador is subject to this mandate.  Upon returning to Ecuador, students who attended 
foreign medical schools, such as at ELAM, are required to complete their year of service.  
However many of these students return already with a specialization, which translates in 
to being assigned to a large urban hospital, ultimately defeating the purpose of the año 
rural (Huish 2013: 134).  Dr. Garcia explained to me the various problems with the año 
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rural; her opinion is not unique.  Dr. Garcia affirmed the goal of the program, for 
physicians to repay the people of Ecuador, particularly the marginalized, with their 
newfound skills.  She was quick to tell me that fortunately, she completed her stint for the 
año rural in the greater Quito area.  This only reemphasized the notion that the idealized 
foundation for the program can become lost on new physicians.   
 Although the program began decades ago, its set up perpetuates the 
marginalization of those always already susceptible to such treatment.  Though 
physicians have received all their formal training, they are only beginning the equally 
valuable process of informal training.  President Correa has made a concerted effort to 
remove barriers for the indigenous communities, but this system appears to contradict 
some of those efforts.  Concerning increased agency, the indigenous communities appear 
to have made gains in the national political discussion, though similar results have not 
been witnessed in terms of biomedical access.  Without consistent access to public 
biomedical care that is comparable to that provided in urban areas, measures of success in 
other sectors, such as education, will never realize their full potential in rural Ecuador. 
 In order to grasp the challenges within the current año rural system it is best to 
investigate the universal issues that most countries face concerning physician 
employment in a rural setting. Compulsory requirements to serve in a specific medical 
setting are often both ineffective and problematic, while intangible aspects such as 
training opportunities, career development prospects, and living and working conditions 
are characteristics that matter more than tangible benefits such as wage increases 
(Serneels et. al 342).  For instance, in Vietnam, physicians who were raised in a rural area 
were twice as likely to return to practice in one when compared to their urban 
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counterparts, which can be attributed to the moral responsibility they felt they owed to 
their communities (Vujicic et. al 972).  That is not to say that financial incentives are 
negligible in physical recruitment.  A meta analysis on physician geographic location that 
incorporated financial lures towards rural areas concluded that  “…financial-incentive 
programs have placed substantial numbers of health workers in underserved areas and 
that program participants are more likely than non-participants to work in underserved 
areas in the long run, even though they are less likely to remain at the site of original 
placement (Bärnighausen and Bloom).”   
 Thus, by perpetuating an ineffective system in which rural service is compulsory 
without addition financial compensation, the Ecuadorian government could potentially 
dissuade physicians from choosing to practice in such a setting permanently.  The added 
combination of little personnel support, few biomedical resources, with no financial 
supplementation creates a program where neither the patients nor the physicians are often 
entirely satisfied in terms of biomedical results.  The same survey did emphasize that 
94% of participants did feel that their year of service during the año rural provided for a 
rewarding experience overall.  Many respondents alluded to a sentiment of greater 
cultural awareness, resulting from their stint in an unfamiliar area (Cavender and Albán 
1943).  Therefore the system does provide some form of benefit, though not in the 
envisioned biomedical sense which is a primary impetus for major change to the system. 
 The año rural has persisted mainly for the increase in biomedical access that the 
service provides to rural areas populated by the lowest socioeconomic group.  In 2013 
   
 65 
31% of Ecuador’s population lived in a rural area compared to 25% in Cuba.19  The 
average is 21% in Latin America and the Caribbean.20  Within the past decade Ecuador 
has greatly augmented its pool of physicians, but those results have not translated to 
greater biomedical access to its disenfranchised citizens in rural Ecuador.  From 2002 to 
2013 Ecuador increased its physician workforce by 54.8% to nearly 32,000, however the 
percent change of physicians practicing in a rural setting via the año rural was only a 
mere 0.7% increase (Ecuador 22).  Physicians are on a one-year rotation, meaning a 
completely new set of replacement doctors arrives annually.  One would expect such a 
sharp rise in the overall physician caused by a spike in medical students; thus, an increase 
of 0.7% seems disproportionately low.  Similarly, the percentage of rural physicians21 did 
not proportionally increase with overall physician growth. Including both general 
practitioners and specialists, only 8.4% of physicians work in a rural setting, a low figure 
considering that the rural population is nearly one third of all Ecuadorians (49).  The 
market for specialists is primarily concentrated around urban centers, further reducing the 
likelihood that physicians will practice in rural settings.  With 75.1% of physicians being 
specialists, the remaining pool of general practitioners, those who typically provide the 
first phase of care in rural areas, is markedly reduced (49).   
For reasons not stated by the Ecuadorian Ministry of Public Health, no major 
domestic effort has been made to recruit more physicians to rural areas.  In a similar 
                                                
19 It should be noted that since 1995 Cuba has reported a rural population of 25%, indicating that either 
population statistics are not regularly updated or the government tightly controls internal movement. 
20 “Latin America” here only includes developing countries, eliminating certain high income economies in 
the Caribbean such as Trinidad and Tobago and the Bahamas. 
21 The term “rural physician” is distinct from the año rural program.  The former is the classification for 
physicians who simply work in the rural setting, not the recently graduated medical students belonging to 
the latter. 
   
 66 
fashion, no real changes have brought any positive results to fruition within the año rural 
program; the stagnant data signals that the ministry is shifting tactics to increase 
biomedical access.  Consequently, the Correa administration has chosen to rely on Cuban 
physicians as contracted staffing; that is, as an external source to occupy the areas in 
which many nationals do not want to practice.  In sum, the Ecuadorian government 
appears to have come to terms and accept the flaws within the current system, but has 
chosen to maintain the status quo to some extent.  Instead, the Ecuadorian Ministry of 
Public Health is reconfiguring another system around the año rural program instead of 
restructuring it from its core.  Perhaps this new interface between the año rural program 
and practice of stationing Cubans in similar environments will effectively improve the 
former by increasing the physician to rural Ecuadorian ratio.  This would help to reduce 
the number of patients seen by Ecuadorian physicians, potentially improving the quality 
of care.  Thus, if implemented carefully, few changes could be made within the año rural 
program, but the biomedical results and physician experiences could overwhelming 
improve thanks to the greater health care environment in which it operates. 
 
III. Reshaping the Political Terrain  
 It is impossible to discuss the current political climate in Ecuadorian health care 
without including a recently implemented law, El Código Orgánico Integral Penal 
(COIP), which redefines what crimes are punishable by imprisonment.  The law is 
prefaced with the following motives: 
Ecuador has recently suffered profound economic, social, and political 
transformations.  The 2008 constitution places the obligation for the national 
judicial system to be revised.  The mixture of different legal systems within 
Ecuador, including various legal bodies that are difficult to unite, has generated a 
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perception of impunity and lack of confidence (The Rep. of Ecuador, Código 
Orgánico Integral Penal 9).  
 
 The law was passed and is beginning to be implemented with relatively little 
attention, with one major exception.  There has been significant criticism from individual 
Ecuadorian physicians, along with the more organized and louder voice of the 
Ecuadorian Federation of Doctors.  Their primary concern is Article 146, which codifies 
sentences of incarceration from three to five years for medical malpractice  (61).  Many 
doctors worry that suits against them could become common practice, evidenced by 
threats of resignations and various protests (Sosa).  Jail sentences will only be applicable 
if the cases are tried in a criminal court.  In a recent interview conducted by a national 
Ecuadorian newspaper with the Executive Secretary of the Ecuadorian Federation of 
Doctors, Dr. Álvarez, he downplayed the notion that a large number of criminal cases 
would be mounted against Ecuadorian physicians (Interview with Executive Secretary).  
He stated that his concern emerged from the high potential of civil law suits, in that they 
would be an easier case for patients to win.  He estimated that doctors could be fined 
upwards of $1,000,000.  In nearly any developed country that sum would be large, 
although it is an estimate so it could be much larger.  Considering the relatively low 
salaries of Ecuadorian physicians, such a steep fine is severe.   
 A compounding factor that physicians will face is the absence of any system of 
malpractice insurance.  Although some argue that this is one mechanism that keeps 
overall health care costs down, it is also viewed as a necessity when the prevalence of 
civil malpractice cases rises within a country.  Without a fallback for physicians, many of 
them view the new law not from the viewpoint of those who have been mistreated by the 
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system, but rather an attack on their profession from the Correa administration.  Dr. 
Álvarez also provided a scenario, which is highly likely to occur in Ecuador.  He 
questioned if the COIP could be applied to a situation in which a doctor was unable to 
provide basic, albeit lifesaving, care in an emergency setting due to a lack of resources.  
Could the doctor be held liable in such a situation?  Should such clinics or hospitals still 
be accredited and kept open?  Subsequently, the public dialogue has been highly charged 
and filled with accusations and misinterpretations of facts.  Perhaps even more troubling 
for the opposition is not what is explicitly expressed within the law, but rather its 
ambiguity.  Article 146 only takes up approximately one-half of a page within the law, 
but has the potential to have the largest impact.  Therefore one goal of the Ecuadorian 
Doctors’ Union is that the law provides a more detailed description of what the article 
entails.   
 The spirit of the COIP in of itself is not being contested—various doctors as well 
as those outside of the medical community agree that Ecuador has a history of physicians 
evading the repercussions of mistakes for which they ought to be responsible.  Virtually 
all seemed to agree that the creation of a malpractice law was a step forward, but that the 
letter of the law is still inadequate.  The Ecuadorian Doctors’ Union and the Correa 
administration are currently in discussion to find a viable solution (Interview with 
Executive Director). 
 As mentioned before, there has been a constant flurry of rumors and threats in the 
national news of physicians publicly talking about resigning in protest against the COIP.  
In January of 2014, President Correa combated such threats in an announcement stating, 
“We have 750 doctors available who are able to come to the country to work… The 
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Ministry of Public Health will start to prepare and the Secretary for Higher Education, 
Science, Technology, and Innovation will recognize their diplomas (“750 medicos 
podrían venir”).”  A similar instance occurred in February, where more than 1,000 
Ecuadorian physicians marched and protested in front of the Ministry of Public Health in 
Quito.  Again the Correa administration responded with strong rhetoric claiming, “3,000 
doctors from countries who are our friends will replace those [Ecuadorian physicians] 
who resign (Sosa).”  Public spats between the government and physicians only 
exacerbate the tensions that already existed.  The arrival of 200 Cuban doctors in August 
of 2014 had been planned for approximately a year prior, but one cannot help but see the 
threat made by President Correa and new foreign doctors hired by the Ecuadorian 
government while tensions remain high.  There is no definite, clear link between the 
creation of the COIP and the recent acquisition of Cuban physicians by the Ecuadorian 
government.  However, I argue that the two situations cannot be easily separated when 
the entire biopolitical landscape is taken into account.   
 In a newsletter from the Ecuadorian Doctors’ Union published in September of 
2014, a section titled “The Strategy of Importing Cuban Doctors” reacts to the official 
arrival of Cuban doctors in August.  The brief article claims that, according to President 
Correa, there are around 800 foreign doctors working within the country, the majority 
being Cuban (Pacheco).  It elaborates on the Ecuadorian government’s supposed 
reasoning for their employment and refutes it:  
The justification was that the Ecuadorian professionals did not accept jobs in 
isolated and far away places.  Nevertheless, almost all of the Cuban physicians 
are in major cities; the remote locations and suburbs continue to lack health care 
access.  That is evidence that the true objective of the [Ecuadorian] government 
is to maintain an atmosphere of fear of dismissal through firings in order to 
continue the exploitation of Ecuadorian physicians (Pacheco). 
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The union continues its criticism by taking aim at the Cuban government for abusing the 
labor rights of the Ecuadorian people, in an apparent attempt to delegitimize the greater 
theme of Cuban international medicine.  This attempts to paint Cuba as a hypocrite, 
claiming it is a party in the Ecuadorian health care capitalistic market by “forcing out” 
local practitioners.  Correa’s strong action against Ecuadorian doctors might be a 
deliberate way to prove his government’s legitimacy.  The union portrays Cuban 
physicians as mercenaries who are easily hired out irrespective of local geopolitical 
consequences for nationals.  Yet, as I argue in the following section, Cuba and its doctors 
view themselves more as missionaries, delegates charged with embodying Che and 
Castro’s revolutionary medicine potentially leading to a shift in political ideologies and 
cultural beliefs that align with Cuba’s. 
 
IV. Enter Cuba 
 The early evidence of a serious bilateral relationship between Ecuador and Cuba 
began soon after President Correa shifted his foreign policy away from American 
interests.  In 2009, approximately two years after taking office, the two nations signed an 
initial, open-ended agreement in Havana concerning matters of health (The Rep. of 
Ecuador, Convenio Marco De Cooperación 1).  The agreement’s scope is fairly wide due 
to its exclusion of specific methods of implementation for such health-related 
agreements; or, this could indicate intentions of long-term cooperation.  The bulk of the 
law provides the legal groundwork for personnel exchanges regarding health care as well 
as health care education.  Each country is made responsible for various factors of the law, 
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but the burden of Cuba is noticeably greater.  According to the agreement, Ecuador must 
merely provide support to the groups and organizations that bilateral cooperation efforts 
would need; “support” is not qualified at any point.  The role of Cuba contrasts with 
Ecuador’s vague supportive responsibilities.  Cuba must provide scholarships for 
Ecuadorian students to study medicine or other health-related professions.  Additionally, 
Cuba is required to send experts and specialists to Ecuador to provide assistance to the 
Ecuadorian Ministry of Public Health.  No mention of finances is made, nor any other 
form of compensation that Ecuador might owe to Cuba.   
 In 2013 and 2014 two new labor-related laws were created to provide a more 
concise legal mechanism for the arrival and incorporation of foreign medical 
professionals into Ecuador.  Neither law specifically mentions Cuba (or any country), but 
I argue the laws essentially exist for the bilateral Cuban-Ecuadorian relationship more 
than any other group of foreigners.  The former law creates a system in which either 
Ecuadorians living abroad or foreigners with a terminal degree can apply for scholarships 
to teach, research, or “to transfer knowledge of specialized themes” in Ecuador (Ecuador, 
Secretary for Higher Education 3).  In my research, the Ecuadorian government, 
beginning under Correa, has cited no other country more frequently as a model and 
source of support more than Cuba.  In recent high-level talks in Havana concerning future 
joint endeavors, the Ecuadorian Minister of Foreign Affairs highlighted the relationship 
between the two countries.  “There exists a strong relationship of cooperation between 
our countries.  Cuba offers us important support in the areas of health, scientific 
development, and technology,” he noted (The Rep. of Ecuador “Cancilleres de Ecuador y 
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Cuba”).  Thus, the new labor laws are only a portion of the entire operation that will 
incorporate Cuba into Ecuadorian health care. 
The newer law concerns the more technical aspects of international partnerships, 
requirements for visa type 12-XI, but is equally important.  The law specifies persons 
eligible for visa type 12-XI must be medical professionals or scientists.  Importantly, the 
new visa law only pertains to nonimmigrant science-related professionals, meaning their 
intended length of stay is definite.  Unless the Ecuadorian government announces new 
agreements with other countries, the cohort of Cuban physicians will be a main 
beneficiary, if not the main beneficiary, of the law.  The visa information is prefaced with 
articles from the Ecuadorian constitution as supporting evidence.  The constitution states, 
“That Article 387… establishes that the State will be responsible for promoting the 
formation and production of knowledge, strengthening the ancestor wisdom, promoting 
technological and scientific investigation, all in order to contribute to the fulfillment of 
Buen Vivir22 or Sumak Kawsay (Ecuador, Secretary for Higher Education 19).”  In sum, it 
is the responsibility of the national government to advance both theoretical and practical 
knowledge within the scientific (biomedical) community.  This concept of the 
constitution is an addition that did not exist in previous one, and it need not be 
overlooked.  The state, by law, is required to expand the pool of biomedical knowledge, a 
charge it appears to be taking quite seriously.  Although Cuba and Ecuador have had a 
semblance of an established program, only now can the national government fully 
endorse and expand into a large-scale comprehensive biomedical program staffed by 
                                                
22 Specific phrase adopted by the Ecuadorian state under the new constitution.  English translation: living 
well (as opposed to living better). 
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foreigners.23  I propose that the creation and approval of these laws by the Ecuadorian 
legislature, spearheaded by the Correa administration, cannot be considered coincidental.  
Superficially, the new labor laws are vague in their lack of specificity concerning their 
target population, but so far Cubans are the only foreigners en masse to see the fruits of 
the laws.  
The Ecuadorian state appears confident in the caliber of a Cuban diploma, as 
already automatically recognizes degrees from universities in Cuba, Chile, and Peru as 
valid; but, this automatic approval is not completely agreed upon.  Those applying to the 
Ecuadorian program from any of the aforementioned countries will therefore have no 
trouble in demonstrating the quality of their education.  A source of discord regarding the 
weight a Cuban medical degree should carry, comes from Ecuadorian physicians. 
Although Cuba routinely receives international acclaim for the superior quality of its 
medical training, there are those in opposition.  In my interview with Dr. Ortiz, dean of a 
well-established medical school in Guayaquil and former director of a large Ecuadorian 
hospital, he speaks to the quality of Cuban medical training.  Dr. Ortiz explains that as 
dean, one responsibility is handling searches and contracting professors for the medical 
school.  Dr. Ortiz recalled that for several years he received frequent emails, one or twice 
per week, from Cuban physicians with their resumes and cover letters attached: 
 
As of late I’m receiving very few [emails], for several I didn’t receive one, that is, 
resumes from Cuban physicians that are ready to come and teach anything.  What 
I wanted to mention is that the resumes from the Cubans who offer their services 
to come as professors caught my attention, but we didn’t hire any.  One of the 
reasons we have not been moved to hire them is because they do not inspire much 
confidence.  That is due to the amount of degrees and specializations that they 
                                                
23 A reference to Operación Milagro, a program established before the Correa administration in 2006.  
Cuban physicians provides basic eye care and procedures at their clinic in Latacunga. 
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have.  For example, people with three or four specialties, specialties very 
different: Psychiatrist and surgeon, or pediatrics and neurology, but not a pediatric 
neurologist.  For us, as a university, it does not give us much confidence.  It 
doesn’t seem that the formation there [Cuba], while yes it is serious, the practice 
and experience…I highly doubt it could be good quality.  I have never seen 
resumes like the Cubans are sending. 
 
Two aspects of this situation are of particular interest, the first being that these physicians 
are actively seeking employment outside of Cuba.  This could mean that some Cuban 
physicians are actively seeking permanent employment outside of Cuba.  Typically, 
Cubans practicing abroad do so through bilateral agreements created by Cuba, not 
individuals.  It remains unclear as to whether the Cuban government would approve these 
situations or if individuals would need to defect.  Second, Dr. Ortiz and his staff might 
already perceive the Cubans as a threat to their employment, regardless of their arrival 
process.  I use this excerpt to show that not all unequivocally agree that the complete 
formation of Cuban physicians is a high caliber, in contrast to statements made by 
reputable entities, such as WHO.  Furthermore, Dr. Ortiz makes the subtle distinction that 
perhaps the theoretical or classroom-based pedagogical formation is reliable, but the 
essential hands-on knowledge might be lacking.  Thus, their formal educational 
formation will not be assessed accurately, regardless of the quality.   
The opinions expressed by Dr. Ortiz should provide insight into the politics of 
educational institutions and potential reactionary stances they might take as more Cubans 
enter the health care system.  These attitudes contradict the legal steps the Ecuadorian 
government has already taken to permit the arrival of Cuban medical personnel.  The 
tension between the government and private sector only reiterates that Cuban physicians 
will be employed by the Ecuadorian state.  Therefore, the atmosphere of welcome the 
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Correa administration has created both legally and rhetorically does not necessarily 
reflect the atmosphere of the actual Ecuadorian health care system. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
 
 The phrase “We live like the poor, but we die like the rich,” allows Cubans to 
accurately articulate the complexities of the society in which they live.  “Luxuries” that 
the rest of the world has access to (whether it is affordable is another matter) are not 
always available in Cuba.  Ironically, it is the Cubans who have access to some of the 
best biomedical care in the world, at no charge.  Cubans take comfort in the knowledge 
that they while they fall short in material goods, they have a privilege that few other 
countries share.  The island of only 11 million inhabitants has made surprising 
accomplishments through the provision of accessible and comprehensive health care that 
is efficiently delivered—a feat no other developing country has been able to achieve.  
The superior health of the Cuban national body has been realized despite the United 
States’ failed attempts to dismantle the communist government.  True, the U.S. embargo 
has undoubtedly limited the availability of new technologies, but Cubans have 
persevered, demonstrated by the system’s ability to adapt and change to an unrelenting 
American foreign policy.  Cuban health care has not a suffered serious, or prolonged, 
decline in the standard of care; it still experiences a progress unique in of itself. 
 Cuba’s motives for delivering health care abroad and educating a targeted 
population in revolutionary medicine have been called into question.  Does Cuba focus 
on international health care to gain political ammunition or out of an altruistic concern for 
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fellow man?  Dr. Williams agreed that the question is often posed, but responded, “Does 
it really matter?”  Cuba will never admit that it keeps international humanitarian efforts 
ongoing to better its international perception.  Though, perhaps it does not matter what its 
motives are.  Either way, its actions do gain them political goodwill and sympathy.  Cuba 
utilizes its biomedical strength via such projects to reshape foreign national bodies into 
ways that embody some of Cuba’s revolutionary principals.  By forming robust bilateral 
relations in health care, Cuba has changed the way in which governments view their own 
challenges.  By addressing the maladies present within their own national bodies and 
taking steps to eliminate them, countries are then allowed the opportunity to solidify their 
national ideology and act accordingly. 
On the other hand, Ecuador has no added barriers from foreign countries, and its 
citizens have access and freedoms that Cubans have lacked since the Revolution.  
Though, Ecuador still remains a stratified society, particularly evident in the health-
related disparities between ethnicities, as well as between rural and urban areas.  Both its 
quality of care and access remain below Cuba’s standards.  Not only does Cuba have 
superior health care indicators, it also commands more attention in the geopolitical 
region, drawing in other Latin American countries associated with the “Pink Tide” to 
become partners.  Members of these new networks, ALBA being the prime example, 
have much to gain from an alliance with Cuba.  Ecuador has successfully shifted its 
alliance towards Cuba without causing any major, prolonged rifts in its relationship with 
the United States.  Even better, it has benefitted from its Cuban alliance while 
simultaneously established itself as a new Ecuador in Latin America.   
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President Correa emphasized when he assumed the presidency that his sovereign 
nation will no longer play a role to support the American dominance in the hemisphere.  
The country instead has taken steps to model itself after countries that greatly contrast to 
the United States.  Ecuador seeks to mimic Cuba in the ideological and physical 
provision of health care.  If the plan to utilize Cuban physicians is successful, this success 
will not only mean the improvement of the Ecuadorian national body.  Success will also 
affirm Cuban international health, with the principles of the Cuban Revolution at its core.  
It will also validate President Correa’s trust in Cuba and spur growth in the Cuban-
Ecuadorian partnership. 
 When I began my research in fall 2013, it was not evident that there was a strong 
relationship between Cuba and Ecuador.  The two governments had various, minor 
agreements, but nothing substantive or long-term.  Though, the partnership was 
foreshadowed by indirect actions such as Ecuador’s growing relationship with Venezuela 
and its member status in ALBA.  Even though that the first wave of Cuban physicians has 
arrived, it remains to be publicized where they are stationed and what the results of their 
labor will be.  Their work must be deemed effective and valuable in order for the 
partnership in health care to grow.  If major problems appear early, it could jeopardize 
the remaining hundreds of Cubans slated to arrive.   
Another factor that could affect the overall Cuban-Ecuadorian relationship is 
Venezuela’s role within the region and relationship with Cuba.  Since sliding into internal 
turmoil after Chavez’s death, Venezuela’s new leader, Nicolás Maduro, appears unable to 
maintain the country’s leadership role in the region and preoccupied by domestic affairs.  
Maduro’s need to focus on Venezuela’s domestic problems could potentially weaken the 
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Cuban-Venezuelan relationship.  Additionally, the widespread violence could cause the 
Cuban government to withdraw physicians out of safety concerns. The remaining void 
left by Venezuela could provide Ecuador the opportunity to grow its prominence in the 
region as well become a stronger trading and ideological partner with Cuba.  Thus, there 
are numerous factors that have the potential to strengthen Ecuador’s ties with Cuba, or to 
derail the current partnership on healthcare.  More time is needed to see if the relatively 
new relationship will continue its current path in which culture, goods, and ideologies are 
exchanged, or if it will digress into a relationship based mainly on trade. 
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